By Burhan Koroglu
The recent series of Arab revolutions began with the first revolution being in Tunisia, and resulted in the people of Tunisia being victorious in removing President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from power, and forcing him into exile. Egypt was next to witness a great popular revolution. However, the revolution in Egypt proved to be bloodier than Tunisia’s, but it was of a shorter duration, and saw a more expeditious resignation of the president, Hosni Mubarak. The outcome of the third popular revolution – in Libya – is still unclear, with rising casualties, and a revolutionary path that is at both a critical and important stage. Outcomes of other revolutions – in Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria – are also unclear.
Turkey has not been removed from the popular revolutions of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Whether at the level of official leadership, sentiments of the population, or through coverage in its media, Turkey has to some degree interacted with all of these events, by posing questions, eliciting reactions, or offering multiple and varied analyses.
After the fall of Ben Ali – whose twenty-three year presidency has been described as militantly secularist and authoritarian, and the fall of Mubarak – who was seen as ardently loyal to the US and Israel, a space emerged in Turkey for intensive debate and discussions around a number of crucial issues which touched on both old and new debates. These include: Islam and democracy, the relationship between the military and democracy, tensions between Islam and modes of political governance, the political application of secularism, the Turkish system as a model for countries in the region, the future of traditional regimes in the region, and possible forms of governance that may emerge in countries in the region.
Political currents in both Tunisia and Egypt, whether on the left or the right on the political spectrum, or oriented around Islam or more western positions, all supported the removal of Mubarak. In Turkey, these political changes further contributed to a shift, across divergent positions – secular, western and Islamic – towards Islamic movements in Tunisia and Egypt. This has further opened a space for new analyses around these issues.
Trends in Turkish politics, and media analysis
Trends that have emerged in the Turkish political arena and in media analysis fall into two main categories:
- The first trend posits that Turkey’s political trajectory, particularly since 2001, can serve as a model for countries in the Muslim world. This trajectory, taken forward by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), is marked by: the party’s Islamic leanings, adoption of parliamentary democracy, secularism that respects religion, the preservation of human rights and associated freedoms, prioritisation of economic development and raising the standard of living, attention to the principle of transparency, efforts to distribute power and ensuring that power is not monopolised by a particular sectarian group or elite class, caution against coming into conflict with other political movements, developing balanced relations between the Muslim world and the West, and improving relations with neighbouring countries through transforming past hostile relations into relationships based on cooperation within a framework of joint action.
This position espouses a global vision that can be adopted by Arab countries that are similar to Turkey. Those who hold this position argue that states that have taken steps towards westernisation and modernisation to become nation-states, such as Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria, should work to accommodate all political movements, especially Islamic movements – and not bar them from participation. It is suggested that these states should apply the principles of social justice, freedom, human rights, and freedom of expression, and should adopt the values of peace, modernisation and development whilst endeavouring to establish a community that maintains its culture. This position holds that the political and economic successes that Turkey has achieved can be emulated by Arab countries similar to Turkey, in a manner appropriate to both their specific and Arab contexts.
- The second trend takes the position that there are significant differences between Turkey and other countries in the Arab world. This view sees Turkey as being more advanced than other Arab countries in terms of democratisation and westernisation. Islamist movements in the Arab world can thus be affected by the process of transformation experienced by Turkey’s Islamic movement, rather than by Turkey’s secular heritage. This current sees Turkey’s Islamist movement, in turn, as having been affected in its inception and growth by the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt.
A large body of Turkish analysis also deals with questions related to the form of the political regimes that will emerge in those Arab countries that have experienced, or will experience, significant political changes – such as Egypt and Tunisia. Some important questions that emerge include: will the Muslim Brotherhood be able to come to power through a majority in elections? What form of government will emerge in this instance? Will new governments be theocratic or have some religious character?
Some analysts in Turkey have also discussed the significant shifts in the Muslim Brotherhood’s thought as has been expressed in the statements of some of the Brotherhood’s key figures, such as the statement by Hassan al-Banna’s grandson Tariq Ramadan to the New York Times, and subsequent statements by Muslim Brotherhood leader Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futuh.
Trends in the ‘Turkish street’ and in political movements
The Turkish street has generally been divided into two main currents with regards to recent events in the Arab world:
- The first trend is of people who have long been interested in Arab affairs. Most of this sector lies within Turkey’s Islamic movements. They see Turkey as an integral part of the Middle East, and hold that Turkey not only has strong historical connections to the Arab world, but just as the current events in the Arab world cannot be ignored, neither can these linkages. They also hold that changes influencing or affecting Turkey will also have an effect on Arab states. People in this trend also display a negative attitude towards policies of oppressive Arab regimes, particularly policies against Islamic groups.
- The second trend is mainly comprised of secular and westernised elites who see Turkey as part of a coalition of western powers. These elites have expressed their discontent with the rapprochement initiatives aimed at the Arab world at the beginning of the 1980s by the late Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, as well as with the strategic relationships pursued by Erdogan’s AKP government since the turn of the millennium. These elites have criticised these policies because they consider Middle Eastern regimes in general to be anti-democratic, dictatorial regimes. With the advent of successive Arab popular revolutions in which Islamic movements have clearly played a role, and in which these movements, both during and after the revolutions, explicitly called for democracy, human rights and civil liberties, secular and westernised Turkish elites have begun to re-examine their criticism, especially insofar as Islamic movements’ demands have resembled, to some extent, the political objectives of Turkey’s AKP.
The Turkish Prime Minister’s call on the former Egyptian regime to heed popular demands met with positive reactions in the Arab street. Both the media and popular sectors in Turkey also dealt with these political developments positively, and with optimism. The developments were viewed as the natural consequence of these societies’ right to democracy and human rights. Simultaneously, sectors of Turkish society that had expressed concern about changes affecting traditional regimes began to express a degree of satisfaction with political developments taking place. As such, the Turkish street and its intellectuals joined human rights activists in expressing their support for establishing relations with countries in the region that were responding to the demands of their populations without resorting to repressive measures, as well as with governments that sought to operate with transparency. These factors served to reinforce these governments’ ethical and moral credentials, while further creating space for rapprochement with Turkey.
Certain sectors in Turkey have been frustrated with European states that have, due to Turkey’s Islamic identity, repeatedly rejected Turkish claims and requests. These sectors have also been uncomfortable with developing strategic partnership and cooperation with Arab states that had exhibited several political and social failings. This discomfort has been a result of several factors including: the forms of governance in these states; the absence of political and moral initiatives by key Arab powers towards central concerns in the Arab world, particularly the Palestinian cause; the violation of civil rights and the suppression of fundamental freedoms in several Arab countries; attitudes towards certain sectarian conflicts such as in Iraq and Lebanon; attempts by certain Arab regimes to conceal their weak political role; and the acquiescence by some Arab states to western attempts to apply formulaic policy changes regarding the religious character of the state. As such, the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen have succeeded in receiving the support of Turkish intellectuals and a cross-sector of Turkish society.
In contrast, certain sections of opposition parties, such as the Republican People’s Party (CHP), have portrayed the official Turkish position as interference in the internal affairs of states, and have characterised the AKP’s stance as an extension of the US policy which is within the framework of the ‘New Middle East’ project. On the other hand, another bloc within the CHP contradicts this position. Instead, this bloc enthusiastically supports the revolution in Libya, accusing the Turkish government of failing to issue a strong enough statement on the issue of the 25 000 Turkish nationals working in Libya, and criticising the government for dragging its feet on the matter.
It seems that the Turkish opposition has not properly appreciated the important regional changes that are under-way, and consider Turkey’s involvement as unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of other states. Some media and press agencies belonging to the opposition have, however, repeatedly pointed to Gaddafi’s negative remarks about Turkey. Notable examples include the coverage of Gaddafi’s negative statements in the presence of the late Turkish Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in 1996. These media outlets have also criticised Erdogan’s acceptance of a human rights award given by Gaddafi last year, claiming that it was hypocritical for Libya to confer such an award when that country does not respect rights.
The fact is that the Turkish position towards the Libyan revolution and its potential consequences have been half-hearted compared to the position taken with regard to the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. This was due to the Turkish government’s concern for the safety of the thousands of Turkish nationals working in Libya. From the onset of the revolution, the Turkish government has primarily been concerned with evacuating its citizens, and was successful in evacuating them in record time compared to the much slower evacuation of western nationals. Additionally, the Turkish government opposed an international resolution to impose sanctions on the Libyan regime as it felt that such sanctions would be more detrimental to the Libyan people than to the regime.
In the face of these critical events currently under-way in certain Arab states, Turkish journalists and academics must conduct deep and comprehensive research and analysis on the countries of the region. In addition, Turkish media need to acknowledge that they do not fully comprehend or appreciate the dynamics of the Arab world. The media should re-evaluate the traditional view of Arab countries as constituting a homogeneous political bloc, and, instead, attune themselves to the social and political differences and nuances that distinguish one Arab country from another.
Despite the good relations established by the Turkish government with the leaders of all Arab countries, the Turkish prime minister and president have, on more than one occasion, stressed the need for leaders of these countries to respond to the popular demands of their citizens, especially demands that call for democracy and greater freedoms. The expeditious meeting and implementation of these demands will help ensure that regional security and stability prevails.
Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has made great efforts to develop relations with all countries in the international arena, particularly those in the European Union. The party heads a majority Muslim state and has adopted a political identity based on two pillars: ‘conservatism’ and ‘democracy’. It has adopted the principles of human rights, citizenship and responsibility, and is not doctrinal nor founded on religious principles. It is natural that the success achieved by this party has ramifications on other Arab countries. Of course, the AKP’s success has ramifications for Arab countries. But, to be a model for the Islamic world, Turkey must continue to foster human rights and democracy to achieve even greater success than that achieved thus far. Within this framework, the ‘new Turkey’ will become a relevant and leading model for the Muslim world.
Challenges in the new era
Despite recent important and positive developments in Turkey, the country has yet to completely rid itself of the negative aspects of its recent history. In addition, Turkey has been unable to fulfil its historic civilisational role. It still faces many challenges, two of the more prominent of which are those relating to religious freedom, and the Kurdish question.
Compared to other Muslim countries, Turkey is better positioned to face its main problems because of its democratically elected political authority that is a reflection and product of popular will. Other Muslim states, however, continue to obstruct the popular will of their people, and it is, therefore, more difficult for them to overcome issues relating to religion and democracy, religion and secularism, and religion and freedom.
Turkey continues to witness an oppositional tug between those who advocate for the maintenance of the prevailing system and those who call for the implementation of the long-heralded change. The latter are in the majority, and wish to dispose of any remnants of the one-party system that imposed a military trusteeship over the country’s politics. They advocate for a state based solely on citizens’ rights and oppose a minority call that not only supports military trusteeship but also criticises the army for not intervening in political life. What matters to the European Union and the Islamic world is not the period of one-party rule and military coups, but the contemporary Turkish experience which began during the reign of former Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, who began charting the course that the AKP government continued pursuing from 2002.
The Turkey that can influence the Muslim world is not the Turkey that adopts a one-party ideology, but a new Turkey that boldly confronts its problems, listens to the will of its people, respects society’s values and their religious beliefs; it is a Turkey that does not see the demands of democracy as a threat.
There is much in common between Turkey on the one hand and Egypt and Tunisia on the other in terms of the political issues faced. The most fundamental issue faced by these countries relates to constitutional reform. Despite the differences in the countries’ constitutions, there are many similarities with respect to directions taken towards new desired constitutions. Turkey can play a key role in this constitutional reform process. Tunisia has already sought to learn from Turkey’s experience on political reform, and Arab embassies in Ankara are looking to take advantage of their situation by learning from the experiences of Turkish democratic institutions such as the higher elections committee, the Turkish constitution, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and Turkey’s system of government. In their demand for a new constitution, the Tunisian opposition has already benefited from the Turkish experience by charting a similar course to Turkey with regards to policies that can foster an economic renaissance. The style of Turkish political discourse is also seen as the appropriate language for internal and external affairs. If states of the Middle East can achieve what has been achieved by Turkey on these issues, the region can become home to very influential and effective political powers.
The new constitution that Turkey plans to draft after the parliamentary elections scheduled for later this year will therefore not be important only for Turkey, but for the Muslim world as a whole. Turkey should actively and consciously work to serve as a model for the Muslim world. It is critical that this model includes economic reforms that have been successfully implemented by the Turkish government, and can also act as a reference for states in the region. If Turkey can succeed in being a good example, it should come as no surprise to see a Turkey, in the near future, that is more politically and economically aligned and integrated with the countries of the region.
Opposition movements in the region face other challenges as well. Foremost among these is the challenge of creating a framework for domestic agreement and cooperation between the different political groups and movements, achieving internal justice and co-existence, the ability to formulate a political discourse that can achieve political integrity, as well as being able to ensure that these translate into secure and strong external relationships. Overcoming these challenges will provide the opportunity for domestic movements to coexist peacefully, and, for the first time, for them to rid themselves of the yoke of external colonial influences. It is in this context that formulating an appropriate political discourse becomes critical. Although Turkey has faced notable problems in this area, the government, led by the AKP, has made significant progress in using appropriate political language and actions. These successes began with the Turkish parliament’s decision not to allow US troops to use Turkish territory for its attack on Iraq in 2003, Erdogan’s celebrated walking out of the 2009 World Economic Forum at Davos, and the 2010 United Nations ‘no’ vote on new sanctions against Iran. It is in this context that Turkey’s growing importance as a successful model for formulating a political discourse that balances domestic demands with external requirements becomes evident for Arab states that are undergoing reforms.
Finally, it is still unclear whether we can truly speak of a ‘new Middle East’. The extent to which the United States is reluctant to speak of a ‘new Middle East’ is the extent to which we can demystify its emergence as a political reality. From this perspective, Turkey can no longer delay the formulation of a regional framework that can assist states in the region to determine their own future. Such a course of action will work to allow these states to determine their policies free from the fetters of western powers and interference, while creating the space for these states to work closely together within a collaborative framework operating in a normal political climate. Therefore, the states that will have the opportunity to actively contribute to the formative stage of such a framework will play a greater role in determining the shape and contours of the the still indistinct and unformulated ‘new Middle East’. In this context, it is incumbent on all stakeholders to start asking themselves to what extent they are prepared to take ownership of this new historical epoch.
*Dr Burhan Koroglu is a professor at the Bahcesehir University in Istanbul, Turkey, who lectures in Islamic philosophy. He is also the director of the Civilization Studies Centre and a regular commentator on Turkish affairs.
**This article is published in terms of an agreement between the Afro-Middle East Centre and the AlJazeera Centre for Studies. It was originally published in Arabic by AlJazeera Centre, and then translated into English by AMEC.
