Make no mistake about it, the tangible accomplishments and historical precedents embodied in this deal rival, if not exceed, other prisoner deals in recent memory. This does not mean that the deal was able to fulfil all expectations placed upon it. Nor does it discount the heavy price Palestinian society and political forces played to realise it. Nor again does it avoid complicated concessions by Hamas in the final conditions placed on the release of some prisoners. All this withstanding, this deal should be recognised as a major Hamas victory; any alternative interpretation of this scorecard misreads the basic balance of forces between Palestinians and their occupier in the context of the struggle to achieve Palestinian rights.
How do we read the 'Shalit deal' and assess its achievements, or otherwise, for the Palestinian movement? What are the criteria by which such deals can be judged and analysed in the first place? In order to answer these questions and appreciate more fully the dynamics at play, it is necessary to gain a command of the facts of the deal, from which a firmer assessment can be based.
In exchange for the release of Israeli army Staff Sergeant Gilad Shalit, who has been held by Hamas since 25 June 2006, Israel will release a total of 1050 prisoners in three stages.
The first stage of the release actually took place in September 2009 when Israel released twenty-three prisoners in exchange for a Hamas-broadcast video indicating a 'sign of life' from Shalit. These prisoners included twenty women and three men from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
The agreed-upon remaining 1027 prisoners are to be released in two stages. The first major stage, scheduled to take place on 18 October 2011, will see Israel release 477 prisoners, including 450 men and twenty-seven women prisoners. These prisoners were the subject of the fiercest negotiations, with each prisoner's fate discussed via indirect negotiations between the contending parties, beneath Egyptian and previously German mediation.
The second and final stage of the deal will take place in two months, entailing the release of 550 prisoners. These prisoners will be released based on a basic set of criteria agreed upon by Hamas and Israel, with the former asserting some discretion over the selection of names. In other words, Israel cannot just arrest 550 people one day, then release them the next, and say they have fulfilled their obligations.
Prisoners released during the first major stage, and which we are limited to discussing at this time, are subject to certain negotiated conditions:
218 will be released to their homes without any conditions (including 133 to Gaza; sixty-eight to the West Bank; nine to East Jerusalem; seven to inside Israel, including one to the Occupied Golan Heights; and one to Jordan);
204 will be deported, including forty abroad, rumoured to be sent to Turkey, Qatar, Syria and Jordan. Of these, 164 will be taken to Gaza, eighteen of whom will be able to return to their homes in the West Bank within three years;
fifty-five will be released with some form of security arrangement, the nature of which has yet to be fully disclosed. This includes forty-nine to the West Bank and six to Jerusalem.
With this as the basic outline of the agreement, 'crunching' the data reveals additional aspects worth highlighting.
Hamas was remarkably successfully in forcing Israel to release large numbers of prisoners with high prison sentences. In fact, 315 of the 477 prisoners released in the first major round have life sentences (310 men, five women); 144 prisoners have sentences longer than ten years; only nine prisoners have sentences less than ten years; and nine other prisoners have undetermined sentences, be they administrative detainees, or yet to be convicted.
The impressive depth of this deal is best illustrated by adding up the total number of years erased by the deal, at least on paper.
Of the 315 prisoners due to be released who are serving life sentences, a little more than half (163) have multiple life sentences (ranging from two to thirty-six). They total 926 life sentences all together. To get a sense of how much prison time this adds up to, Israeli civilian courts set one 'life sentence' at twenty-five years of prison time. Aside from the few cases of Palestinians tried in these courts—generally because they are Israeli citizens—most Palestinian prisoners do not have recourse to this interpretation of 'life sentence' because they are tried in military courts where the duration of life sentences is left open ended. If an Israeli civil court understanding for a life sentence (twenty-five years) is nonetheless applied to the number of Palestinians sentenced to life in prison, we arrive at the figure of 23,150 years negated through this deal. It needs to be emphasised that this figure is only for illustrative purposes, as, in any case, a prisoner would not be able to serve more than three of these life sentences (seventy-five years) in a given life time. Moreover, a certain portion of these years has already been served, and cannot hence be 'erased'.
In addition to those serving life sentences, however, the total number of years of those serving high but non-life prison sentences totals just over 4,585 years.
If both figures are added together, a staggering 27,735 years are technically negated by the deal. All this from less than half the total number of prisoners released (roughly 45 percent).
The Shalit deal sees Palestinian prisoners released from historical periods that date back to before the first intifada, to the most recent period of Palestinian history: forty prisoners were arrested before the first intifada (pre-8 December 1987); 112 were arrested during the first intifada (December 1987 – 13 September 1993); eighty-one were arrested during the 'Oslo peace process' years (September 1997 - 28 September 2000); and the remaining 244 are from the second intifada (September 2000 - present).
According to Israeli Prison Services, the political distribution of prisoners to be released is as follows: 307 prisoners are from Hamas, ninety-nine from Fatah, twenty-seven from the Islamic Jihad, and twenty-four from the Popular Front. The remaining prisoners derive from smaller factions (mainly the Democratic Front, the Popular Resistance Committees, and the Popular Front-General Command), or are unaffiliated with any political group.
Released prisoners hail from all geographic locations within historic Palestine including 289 from the West Bank, 134 from Gaza, forty-six from East Jerusalem, and eight from Palestinian communities inside Israel, including one from the occupied Golan Heights. Among the West Bankers is one woman who resided in Jordan, and a second who is Ukrainian, but lives in the West Bank.
Viewed in this context, Shalit's capture and detention for five years, and Hamas' ultimate successful negotiation for a prisoner release are all the more impressive. The deal represents the first time that any Palestinian organisation captured an Israeli soldier in territorial Palestine and was able to translate this capture into a negotiated settlement with the Israeli government. Whether one agrees or disagrees with this as a tactic, there is no question that this series of events represents a significant advance for the armed resistance capabilities of the Palestinian movement, its organisational capabilities, professionalism, secrecy and stamina. No other conclusion is possible in the context of Gaza, where Israel and Egypt control its land passages; Israel controls and constantly monitors the territory via air, satellite and sea, and where electromagnetic airwaves and telecommunication networks are also dominated by Israel. Moreover, Israel also runs a substantial network of Palestinian collaborators throughout the area. These are the known means of Israeli domination over the Gaza Strip's 360 square kilometres.
All these accomplishments relate to the fact that a deal took place, and do not relate to the substantial achievements in the negotiations themselves. But here, too, Hamas forced impressive concessions: it broke Israel's traditional refusal to release alleged 'prisoners with blood on their hands', and it broke Israel's principled rejection to release prisoners from 1948 Palestine (Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship) as well as those from East Jerusalem. To contextualise the latter two precedents, all previous prisoner releases negotiated with the Palestinian Authority and Hizbullah have failed to break these formerly steadfast Israeli positions.
Aside from setting new precedents in negotiations, Hamas' selection of prisoners emphasised important political dimensions that must also be seen as important achievements, while rejecting certain Israeli tenets of praxis vis-à-vis the Palestinian people.
The deal's inclusion of prisoners from throughout geographic Palestine, the Palestinian diaspora, and the occupied Golan Heights represents a conscious effort by Hamas to assert the unity of the Palestinian people and their connectedness to its Arab/ Muslim periphery. The inclusion of prisoners from across the Palestinian political spectrum equally asserts the national, as opposed to factional, accomplishment of the deal. Inclusion of prisoners from the pre-first intifada period to the present also emphasises the cross-generational nature of Palestinian struggle, while implicitly criticising the Oslo 'peace process'' failure to release prisoners from these early periods.
Although it is complicated to compare prisoner releases given the shifting nature of interests and needs at given times, suffice it to say that Hamas achieved as much as or more than many of the most well-known prisoner deals carried out with Israel in the past 30 years: the 1985 prisoner exchange between the PFLP-General Command and Israel saw 1150 prisoners exchanged for three live Israeli soldiers; the 2004 Hizbullah-Israel swap saw Israel release 431 Arab and international prisoners and fifty-nine bodies for one live and three dead Israeli military personnel; the 2008 Hizbullah-Israel deal saw the exchange of 204 Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners for two dead Israeli soldiers. All other exchanges were less significant quantitatively and 'qualitatively'. It might be illustrative to note that Hizbullah's first successful prisoner exchange with Israel saw the exchange of two Israeli bodies and nineteen South Lebanon Army personnel for 123 bodies and forty-five prisoners. The Shalit deal was Hamas' first exchange but likely not to be its last.
The Shalit deal is not without its critics from the Palestinian side. They can be grouped into three categories:
Politicaltiming:Hamasopeneditselftoadditionalcriticismontwofrontsregardingthedeal'stiming.ComingscarcelythreeweeksafterPLOChairmanMahmoudAbbas' bidforPalestinianstatehoodattheUN,Hamaswascriticised,particularlybyelementsofFatah,forattemptingtostealAbbas' 'thunder'.Furthermore,thedealalsocameontheeleventhdayofamajorPalestinianhungerstrikeprotestingprisonconditions,particularlythepolicyofsustainedsolitaryconfinement(uptoeightyearsandcountinginsomecases).Criticsarguethattheprisonerexchangeisoutofstepandpoorlycoordinatedwiththehungerstrike,whilethecelebratoryatmospheretheprisonerexchangeushersincontradictstheseriousnessdemandedofthehungerstrike.Concernedpartiesevenarguethatthepoortimingmaycontributetoendangeringsomeofthehungerstrikers' lives,orbreakingthestrikeearlywithoutachievingitsdemands.
While the validity of these criticisms will reveal themselves over time, the political fallout of the Shalit deal can already be stated: Hamas and its agenda are unquestionably bolstered by the deal, enabling it to mitigate any popularity gap that might have arisen between the movement and its rival Fatah in the wake of the latter's UN statehood bid. This is because Hamas will be able to argue that while Fatah makes grandiose speeches at the UN and is welcomed in international fora, its strategy (political negotiations with Israel) failed to ever achieve a substantive prisoner release, and hence Fatah cannot be expected to achieve the far larger goal of statehood. Hamas will argue that despite it pariah status by the Western powers, the movement remained steadfast in its non-recognition of Israel and its resistance-oriented strategy to achieve Palestinian rights, and in the end reaped tangible, political and human rewards of value to the movement and its future.
While debating these issues is indeed important and necessary for the Palestinian movement and its allies, the real political legacy of this deal might be more obvious than this simplified polarity suggests. That is to say that for any political strategy pursued by Palestinians and their allies to succeed, the enormous disparity in the 'valuation' between Palestinian and Israeli people and prisoners of war needs to end. That one single Israeli soldier could be negotiated for more than one thousand Palestinians gives pause to question how a situation arose locally and internationally where such disparity of value became possible.
To illustrate this disparity, suffice it to say that twenty-six Palestinian prisoners in the Shalit deal were already in prison before Gilad Shalit was even born, with the longest amongst them—Nael Barghouti–having served thirty-four years in prison. In fact, ten Palestinian prisoners expected to be freed in this deal spent more time in Israeli prison than Nelson Mandela spent on Robben Island, although not one of them is known to non-Arabic-speaking publics. Not one of them—Sami Yunis, Fuad al-Razem, Uthman Musalah, Hasan Salama, Akram Mansour, Fakhri Barghouti, Ibrahim Jaber, Muhammad Abu Hud'a, Nael Barghouti, and Salim Kiyal—is the subject of a Wikipedia entry, for example. In contrast, Gilad Shalit, who has spent five years in captivity, is a household name in many western countries, holds honorary citizenship in three countries, and has Wikipedia pages translated into twenty-three languages. The disparity in perception, organisation and financing between Zionist propaganda and Palestinian organising is obvious, shocking and humbling. This is the legacy of entrenched racism, complicit media practices, sustained dehumanisation campaigns, asymmetrical colonial and global power dynamics, disorganised or incompetent political projects and priorities. Whatever the cause, the disparity must be eradicated, and fast.
Let this prisoner deal light a path to areas of neglected work that need to be focused on in the coming period among Palestinians and their allies in order to ensure that never again will the racism and discrepancy of human value between the colonised and the coloniser be able to prevail for so long.
* This article was first published by Jadaliyya, and is published here with permission