Romana Rubeo and Ramzy Baroud
On 4 February 2021, representatives from the Palestinian movement Hamas visited Moscow to inform the Russian government of the latest developments in unity talks between the Islamic resistance movement and its Palestinian counterparts, especially Fatah.
This was not the first time that Hamas’s officials had travelled to Moscow on similar missions. In fact, Moscow continues to represent an important political breathing space for Hamas, which has been isolated by Israel’s western benefactors. Involved in imposing this isolation are also several Arab governments that, undoubtedly, have done little to break the Israeli siege on Gaza.
The Russia-Hamas closeness is already paying dividends. On 17 February, shipments of the Russian COVID-19 vaccine, Sputnik V, made their way into Gaza via Israel, a testament to that growing rapport, and how it is being leveraged for the Palestinian benefit. While Russia alone cannot effect a complete paradigm shift in the case of Palestine, Hamas feels that a Russian alternative to the blind and conditional American support for Israel is possible, if not urgent.
Recently, we interviewed Dr Daud Abdullah, author of Engaging the World: The Making of Hamas’s Foreign Policy, and Na’eem Jeenah, executive director of the Afro-Middle East Centre in Johannesburg, which published Abdullah’s book.
By Ramzy Baroud
Israeli anxiety was palpable after Israel’s prime minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, waited for days to be contacted by the new US president, Joe Biden, after the latter’s inauguration. While much is being read into Biden’s decision, including Washington’s lack of enthusiasm to return to the ‘peace process’, Moscow is generating attention as a possible alternative to the USA by hosting inter-Palestinian dialogue and discussing the future with leaders of Palestinian political groups.
By Ramzy Baroud
In September 2017, organizers of the ‘Africa-Israel Summit’ indefinitely postponed their event which was scheduled to be held in Lomé, Togo, from 23 to 27 October, a month after they made their decision. What Israeli leaders saw as a temporary setback was partly the result of intense, behind-the-scenes lobbying of several African and Arab countries, including South Africa, Algeria, and Morocco.
The conference and its postponement, or, more correctly, cancellation, was, however, hardly the beginning or end of the efforts of Israeli prime minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, to court Africa. In January 2019, Tel Aviv announced it had established diplomatic relations with Chad, and that Mali, also a Muslim majority country, would follow suit soon thereafter.
By Nikolay Kozhanov
The Israeli-Emirati Memorandum of understanding and cooperation on the use of storage capacities and pipeline infrastructure of the Israeli Europe-Asia Pipeline Company (EAPC – previously the Eilat Ashkelon Pipeline Co Ltd) will undoubtedly benefit both Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv. However, the agreement is unlikely to have the strong impact on the oil market that is currently claimed by the signatories.
The agreement on normalisation of relations between the UAE and Israel, signed in September, is becoming the cornerstone of the legal and contractual basis for the development of future Israeli-Emirati relations. During the bilateral business summit held in Abu Dhabi in late October 2020, the two countries signed a number of important documents, including a memorandum on the use and development of the EPAC oil and oil products infrastructure. According to the Israeli and Emirati media, this step should open up access for the UAE to theEuropean oil market. However, such statements are somewhat inconsistent with reality.