Na’eem Jeenah, editor, Pretending Democracy: Israel, An Ethnocratic State. Johannesburg: Afro-Middle East Centre, 2012.
Jadaliyya (J): What made you publish this book?
Na’eem Jeenah (NJ): The book emerged out of a conference organized by the Afro-Middle East Centre and which was held in Pretoria, South Africa. The conference brought together important scholars who have being thinking and writing about the issue of the nature of the Israeli state, those who are affected by this, and also ways in which to move beyond the ethnocratic state that Israel is towards a future that can address the injustices that have been heaped on Palestinians by Israel’s Zionist policies and practices. In conceptualizing the conference we were determined that the critical ideas emerging from it should be collected into a book. The book is really an attempt by the Afro-Middle East Centre to provide some fresh thinking on what the Israeli state is, what it pretends to be, and how that can be changed.
J: Who are the contributors to the book?
NJ: Ali Abunimah, Neville Alexander, Max du Plessis, Steven Friedman, Daryl Glaser, Ran Greenstein, Heidi Grunebaum, Adam Habib, Na'eem Jeenah, Ronnie Kasrils, Smadar Lavie, Fouad Moughrabi, Nadim N. Rouhana, Shlomo Sand, Avi Shlaim, Azzam Tamimi, Salim Vally, Oren Yiftachel, and Andre Zaaiman.
J: What particular themes and issues does it address?
NJ: The book is divided into four parts: “Israel and its Founding Myths”; “The Ethnic State and its Victims”; “Comparative Ethnic Nationalisms”; and “Beyond Ethnic Nationalism.”
The first part includes chapters by Shlomo Sand and Avi Shlaim, which lay the basis for the following chapters, about Jewish nationhood, nationalism, and Israeli statehood. Sand critically examines the notion that Jews belong to a single nation with a common ancestry. He suggests that the “Jewish nation” is, in fact, a recent invention created for political purposes. Shlaim examines some of the issues that characterized debates among early Zionists and concludes that on matters of principle, strategy, and tactics there were few significant differences between the “right” and the “left.”
Part Two covers issues related to the victims of the Israeli state, their plight, and ways of progressing beyond the situation of victimhood. Ran Greenstein explores the meaning and implications of the notion that Israel is an ethnic state; Oren Yiftachel builds on his contention in earlier writings that Israel is an ethnocracy; Max du Plessis, who was a member of a research team that investigated Israel’s actions from the perspective of international law, writes about the findings of that study and its conclusion that Israel’s actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory constitute occupation, colonialism, and apartheid. He argues that a case should be made against Israel in the International Court of Justice. Nadim Rouhana’s chapter about Palestinian citizens of Israel argues for reconciliation—including redress for past injustices—between Jewish and Palestinian citizens. The final chapter in this part, by Smadar Lavie, looks at Jewish victims of Zionism—particularly Mizrahi Jews.
Part Three compares Jewish nationalism in Israel with other forms of nationalism. Neville Alexander discusses the national question, particularly in South Africa, providing food for thought for those trying to succeed where South Africa seems to be failing. Andre Zaaiman writes about his personal experience of growing up with Afrikaner nationalism and compares that to Jewish nationalism. Daryl Glaser discusses Israel, South Africa, and Ulster as “settler democracies.” Adam Habib reflects on the role of the international community in South Africa and Israel, arguing that ethnic states are unsustainable. Heidi Grunebaum examines South African Zionism through the Jewish National Fund. In his chapter, Ronnie Kasrils applies the lens of “colonialism of a special type”—previously employed by the South African Communist Party—to analyze the Palestinian-Israeli situation.
The last part of the book looks at the theme “Beyond Ethnic Nationalism,” and points to possible future solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli question. Azzam Tamimi presents a Palestinian Islamist perspective on future possibilities, focusing particularly on Hamas. Steven Friedman argues that the notion of Jews living as a minority in a future single state with a Palestinian majority is not a shocking prospect. Jewish survival, he asserts, does not hinge on a “Jewish state.” Fouad Moughrabi suggests that there is “radical hope” in the cultural activities of young Palestinians. Ali Abunimah suggests that the South African experience of ending apartheid might be useful in pointing towards a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli question and argues for a peaceful transition to a single democratic state in Palestine-Israel. Finally, Salim Vally and I take the one-state argument of Ali and Steven a little further, arguing that a major part of making such a solution work successfully for all its people will be a careful and thorough resolution of the national question. We suggest that the project of building a new nation may be more important for Palestinians and Israelis than resolving the question of statehood.
The book includes a foreword by South African deputy minister of international relations, Ebrahim Ebrahim.
J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?
NJ: While the book is aimed at academics and those involved in the question of Palestine and Israel, we were determined to produce a book that will be accessible to anyone that wants to unpack what the Israel state is all about.
We hope that it will help enhance scholarly debate around the nature of the Israeli state and the question of the place of ethnocracies in our world today. We also believe that the book raises debates that can contribute towards the process of finding solutions for the future of Palestinians and Israeli Jews.
J: What other projects are you working on now?
NJ: Two projects will come together early in 2013. The first is the re-publication of a book by Azzam Tamimi on the life of the leader of the Tunisian Ennahda movement / party, Rachid al-Ghannouchi. The book is called A Democrat Within Islamism. It’s a very timely re-publication and will include a new afterword by the author and a foreword by me.
The second project is a book on the PLO, with contributions from a range of Palestinian activists and scholars. In a sense, this book is an “internal” conversation between Palestinians, which we are allowing readers to be voyeurs to. The book was originally published in Arabic and we have translated it for an English-speaking audience.
J: What kinds of insights does your book present for Israel regarding alternative state models to an ethnocracy?
NJ: Well, to be honest, the book has not been too creative in providing a range of alternative models. There is a strong argument that the best way forward is a single democratic state whose citizens will include all Palestinians and Jewish citizens of Israel. There are also some suggestions for a binational state. In either case, the overriding idea is a democratic state where all citizens have equal rights and where there will be determined attempts at redressing the injustices of the past.
Excerpts from Pretending Democracy: Israel, An Ethnocratic State:
[There is] a duality in the Israeli state between a democratic facade and a deeper undemocratic regime logic, which facilitates the dispossession, control, and peripheralization of groups that do not belong to the dominant ethno-class. Thus the very nature of the settling ethnocracy, which combines expansion, settlement, segregation, and ethno-class stratification, militates against the effectiveness of challenges emanating from peripheral groups. The selective openness of the regime, which allows for public protest, free speech, and periodic elections, is largely an illusion: the ethnocratic regime has arranged itself politically, culturally, and geographically so as to absorb, contain, or ignore the challenge emerging from its peripheries, thereby trapping them in their respective predicaments. – Oren Yiftachel
Most Jewish Israelis and the Zionist movement across the world like to insist that Israel is what they call a “Jewish and democratic state.” Without realizing the irony or contradiction in this, they insist that both epithets—Jewish and democratic—equally apply to the Israeli state. Further, while other states define themselves for themselves and their citizens, Israelis go beyond that and insist that others recognize their state’s “Jewish and democratic” character too. The refusal of the Palestinian Authority (PA), for example, to agree to recognize Israel as a “Jewish state” has been a sticking point in negotiations between the PA and the Israelis.
Israel is, in fact, as much a Jewish state and a democratic state as apartheid South Africa was a white state and a democratic state. Israel is not exclusively Jewish, and Israel is certainly not democratic. Both are pretenses upheld for political purposes—for the sake of obtaining legitimacy for the Israeli state and as an attempt to mask a form of ethnic cleansing. The truth is that Israel is an ethnocratic state; perhaps a more accurate description would be “a Jewish and ethnocratic state.”
The notion of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state” requires some interrogation. The defenders of this notion go to great lengths to attempt to show that the terms “Jewish” and “democratic” are not contradictory and that a state can be ethnically based and still be democratic. It is a difficult argument to sustain.
Even though the notion of Israel being “Jewish and democratic” has been used by certain Israelis since the late 1960s (mostly by the Israeli “left”), the official use of this phrase is just two decades old. Israel’s 1948 Declaration of Independence mentions its Jewish character but makes no mention of democracy. It does, however, claim that the state will “ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race, or sex” and that it would “guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education, and culture”—stipulations which, in themselves, convey a sense of democratic values—except that they have not been implemented in reality
In 1992, Israel discussed and then adopted two new Basic Laws after which the term “Jewish and democratic” entered official discourse. Known as Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, these basic laws—especially the first—ostensibly provide for the human rights of Israeli citizens. Thus, for example, retired president of the Israeli supreme court and professor of law, Aharon Barak, argues that the two laws “serve as the Israeli equivalent of the Bill of Rights.” The first clause of the Human Dignity and Liberty Law states: “The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state” (emphasis added). The oxymoronic phrase was introduced in order to satisfy both the Jewish religious parties (which insisted on “Jewish” being explicit) and the Jewish secular parties (which insisted that “democratic” be explicit)...
If conventional wisdom is to be believed, the idea that Jews might survive culturally and physically as a minority in a Palestinian state is a dangerous fantasy. But if Jewish tradition and experience is to be believed, there is nothing odd—let alone fantastic—about the possibility.
A core Zionist assumption is that Jewish survival hinges on Jews maintaining a specifically Jewish state; without this, it is claimed, Jews face the constant threat of the genocidal violence unleashed by Nazism—or, at least, of constant persecution.
While this claim that a state is the only plausible antidote to the threat of extinction is by far the dominant Zionist concern, an ethno-nationalist state is also often held to be essential for the maintenance and expression of an authentic Jewish identity: political Zionism has, therefore, been described by some of its academic adherents as the “national liberation movement of the Jewish people.” These assumptions are a core obstacle to a just and democratic resolution of the Palestinian conflict. Not only do they reject the notion of a single, democratic polity shared by Jews and Palestinians, they also make more limited attempts at accommodation impossible by constantly reinforcing a sense of threat within the Jewish Israeli mainstream and, as a consequence, a demand for “security” at virtually any cost to ward off the danger. This has enabled successive Israeli governments to pass off virtually any measure inimical to Palestinian interests as a “security” precaution, which may at least partly explain the continuing rightward shift in Jewish Israeli politics. Continued Palestinian resistance is portrayed as an existential threat (and its failure to disappear is seen to demand ever more extreme measures to eliminate it). While critics of a single democratic state often cite this Israeli assumption as an argument for a “two-state solution” on the grounds that Jewish Israelis will never relinquish the protection of an ethnic state, it increasingly presents itself as an abiding obstacle to any sort of solution.
As long as Jewish survival is equated with the maintenance of an ethnic state, no resolution that might win sustained Palestinian loyalty is possible. The rigidity of the Jewish Israeli equation of ethnic statehood with safety, often cited as an eternal obstacle to a single state, is in reality also a powerful argument against the viability of a “two-state solution.” As long as this equation persists, it seems highly implausible that a separate Palestinian state will appear to mainstream Israeli opinion as a viable guarantor of the security of the Israeli state. And if the view that ethnic statehood is integral to Jewish survival begins to erode, then so does much of the rationale for two separate states. The insistence that without a state of their own Jews are in constant peril is thus an obstacle to any settlement, even one which concedes the principle of Jewish ethnic statehood. This means that accepting the principle of Jewish ethnic statehood on pragmatic grounds, arguing that only this scenario offers any prospect of a settlement, is a strategy doomed to fail. Prospects for justice and peace rest, then, on positing a future in which Jewish statehood will no longer be seen as essential to Jewish survival and in which minority status in a democratic state will be seen as an appropriate means of achieving Jewish security.
An obvious objection to this approach is that it seems to deny Palestinian agency by making Jewish opinion a precondition for a just and peaceful end to the suppression of Palestinian rights. It is therefore important to stress that the analysis presented here assumes that changes in Jewish opinion are likely only if there is a fundamental challenge to the prevailing balance of power and that this requires an effective Palestinian campaign to deprive Zionism of its legitimacy. This is not the place to discuss the strategies which might achieve that, save to say that the emergence of the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement holds out the prospect of a new Palestinian politics that can offer more effective resistance to ethnic domination and might well generate the secular democratic political organization required for that domination to end. But change in Palestine, as was the case in South Africa, is not purely a matter of the victims of ethnic domination mustering enough strength to defeat the system—it depends also on the emergence of divisions within the dominating group. In Palestine, as in South Africa, pressure is required to force the dominant group to reassess its options. But the military strength of the Israeli state means that this pressure is unlikely to overthrow the system of domination: its purpose is thus to force those who preside over it to reconsider their options and to negotiate a settlement with Palestinian leadership. It follows clearly from this that change will require a reassessment of Zionist options. The question of whether mainstream Jewish understandings of identity and security are capable of adjusting to the possibility of a shared state with a Palestinian majority is crucial to prospects for a settlement.
For anyone interested in Palestine, and in national liberation struggles more broadly, AMEC’s powerful new book, The PLO: Critical appraisals from the inside, provides an essential anthology of key perspectives on the Palestinian struggle up to 2006. The book offers readers a rare opportunity to eavesdrop on the conversations of those intimately involved in searching for solutions to one of the world’s most intractable conflicts.
At the turn of the millennium, after decades of struggle, the Palestinian Liberation Organization was in a shambles. In 2005, a reconciliation conference held in Cairo seemed to offer some hope for the revitalisation of the organisation, but Hamas’s victory in the 2006 Palestinian Authority elections caught the PLO off-guard. Conflicts and tensions exploded as the PLO tried to claw back the power it had lost. Amid calls for the organisation to renew itself or make way for a new group, the al-aytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations convened a conference in Beirut to discuss the PLO. Representatives of the PLO’s main factions joined leaders from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, as well as activists and academics, to discuss what they could learn from the past, and try to forge some consensus on how to take the Palestinian struggle forward.
Critical Appraisals from the Inside documents the papers and debates presented at the conference. Originally published in Arabic, the book provides a fascinating window on Palestinians’ unique understandings of the history of their struggle, and of the PLO. It offers an insider’s view on issues such as national unity, the intricate nature of relations between Palestinians in the diaspora and those in the Occupied Territory, the fragmented nature of the Arab condition, as well as the impact of the meddling by Arab nations and western powers in Palestinian affairs.
The book was originally published in Arabic by the Beirut-based Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, and was translated into English and republished by the Afro-Middle East Centre. It was edited by AMEC’s executive director, Na’eem Jeenah, and Al-Zaytouna Centre director, Mohsen Moh’d Saleh.
Contributing authors include:
Mohsen Moh’d Saleh
Nafez Abu Hasna
Muhammad Tayseer al-Khatib
Ahmad Said Nufal
Saqr Abu Fakhr
Mohammed Sayed Said
Fathi Abu al-Ardat
Marwan Abdul Al
Anwar Abu Taha
The table of contents includes:
Mohsen Moh’d Saleh
The PLO’s journey from 1964 to 2006: An overview
The rise of Palestinian national consciousness in the PLO
Nafez Abu Hasna
Towards an inclusive national charter
Muhammad Tayseer al-Khatib
The Palestinian National Council: Restructuring for
Mohsen Moh’d Saleh
Towards a healthy relationship between the PLO and
the Palestinian Authority
Ahmad Said Nufal
The PLO and endeavours to forge Palestinian national unity
The PLO’s planning and research centres: Academic freedom
and academic research
Saqr Abu Fakhr
The PLO’s handling of the refugee issue
The PLO’s management of negotiations with Israel
The PLO’s perspective on Arab–Palestinian relations
Mohammed Sayed Said
Towards a new kind of international diplomacy for the PLO
Rebuilding the PLO: Fatah’s perspective
Fathi Abu al-Ardat
Rebuilding and reactivating the PLO: The Hamas perspective
The PLO – present reality and future prospects:
The perspective of the Popular Front for the Liberation
Marwan Abdul Al
Rebuilding the PLO: The perspective of the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad movement
Anwar Abu Taha
Rebuilding the PLO: The perspective of the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine
26 November 2012
Agenda item 37
Question of Palestine
Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, China, Comoros, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zimbabwe and Palestine: draft resolution
Status of Palestine in the United Nations
The General Assembly,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and stressing in this regard the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
Recalling its resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970,1by which it affirmed, inter alia, the duty of every State to promote through joint and separate action the realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
Stressing the importance of maintaining and strengthening international peace founded upon freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights,
Recalling its resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947,
Reaffirming the principle, set out in the Charter, of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force,
Reaffirming also relevant Security Council resolutions, including, inter alia, resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,
446 (1979) of 22 March 1979, 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008,
Reaffirming further the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,2to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, including, inter alia, with regard to the matter of prisoners,
Reaffirming its resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 and all relevant resolutions, including resolution 66/146 of 19 December 2011, reaffirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right to their independent State of Palestine,
Reaffirming also its resolutions 43/176 of 15 December 1988 and 66/17 of 30 November 2011 and all relevant resolutions regarding the Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, which, inter alia, stress the need for the withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, primarily the right to self-determination and the right to their independent State, a just resolution of the problem of the Palestine refugees in conformity with resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 and the complete cessation of all Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Reaffirming further its resolution 66/18 of 30 November 2011 and all relevant resolutions regarding the status of Jerusalem, bearing in mind that the annexation of East Jerusalem is not recognized by the international community, and emphasizing the need for a way to be found through negotiations to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the capital of two States,
Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 9 July 2004,3
Reaffirming its resolution 58/292 of 6 May 2004, affirming, inter alia, that the status of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, remains one of military occupation and that, in accordance with international law and relevant United Nations resolutions, the Palestinian people have the right to self-determination and to sovereignty over their territory,
Recalling its resolutions 3210 (XXIX) of 14 October 1974 and 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, by which, respectively, the Palestine Liberation Organization was invited to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly as the representative of the Palestinian people and was granted observer status,
Recalling also its resolution 43/177 of 15 December 1988, by which it, inter alia, acknowledged the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988 and decided that the designation "Palestine" should be used in place of the designation "Palestine Liberation Organization" in the United Nations system, without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the Palestine Liberation Organization within the United Nations system,
Taking into consideration that the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in accordance with a decision by the Palestine National Council, is entrusted with the powers and responsibilities of the Provisional Government of the State of Palestine,4
Recalling its resolution 52/250 of 7 July 1998, by which additional rights and privileges were accorded to Palestine in its capacity as observer,
Recalling also the Arab Peace Initiative adopted in March 2002 by the Council of the League of Arab States,5
Reaffirming its commitment, in accordance with international law, to the two-State solution of an independent, sovereign, democratic, viable and contiguous State of Palestine living side by side with Israel in peace and security on the basis of the pre-1967 borders,
Bearing in mind the mutual recognition of 9 September 1993 between the Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,6
Affirming the right of all States in the region to live in peace within secure and internationally recognized borders,
Commending the Palestinian National Authority's 2009 plan for constructing the institutions of an independent Palestinian State within a two-year period, and welcoming the positive assessments in this regard about readiness for statehood by the World Bank, the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund and as reflected in the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee Chair conclusions of April 2011 and subsequent Chair conclusions, which determined that the Palestinian Authority is above the threshold for a functioning State in key sectors studied,
Recognizing that full membership is enjoyed by Palestine in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Group of Asia-Pacific States and that Palestine is also a full member of the League of Arab States, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Group of 77 and China,
Recognizing also that, to date, 132 States Members of the United Nations have accorded recognition to the State of Palestine,
Taking note of the 11 November 2011 report of the Security Council Committee on the Admission of New Members,7
Stressing the permanent responsibility of the United Nations towards the question of Palestine until it is satisfactorily resolved in all its aspects,
Reaffirming the principle of universality of membership of the United Nations,
1. Reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to independence in their State of Palestine on the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967;
2. Decides to accord to Palestine non-member observer State status in the United Nations, without prejudice to the acquired rights, privileges and role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations as the representative of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and practice;
3. Expresses the hope that the Security Council will consider favourably the application submitted on 23 September 2011 by the State of Palestine for admission to full membership in the United Nations;8
4. Affirms its determination to contribute to the achievement of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the attainment of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East that ends the occupation that began in 1967 and fulfils the vision of two States: an independent, sovereign, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine living side by side in peace and security with Israel on the basis of the pre-1967 borders;
5. Expresses the urgent need for the resumption and acceleration of negotiations within the Middle East peace process based on the relevant United Nations resolutions, the terms of reference of the Madrid Conference, including the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative5 and the Quartet road map to a permanent two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict9 for the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement between the Palestinian and Israeli sides that resolves all outstanding core issues, namely the Palestine refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, borders, security and water;
6. Urges all States, the specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system to continue to support and assist the Palestinian people in the early realization of their right to self-determination, independence and freedom;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to implement the present resolution and to report to the Assembly within three months on progress made in this regard.
1Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
2United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
3See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1; see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136.
4See A/43/928, annex.
5A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
6See A/48/486-S/26560, annex.
8A/66/371-S/2011/592, annex I.
By Ashwin Pienaar
On Thursday 3 June 2010, South Africa announced it would be recalling its ambassador to Israel, following the latter's raid on a flotilla of ships carrying aid to Gaza. The incident, which took place in international waters early on Monday, 31 May 2010, left nine activists dead and over 30 wounded.
In a media conference held in Pretoria on Thursday 3 June, South Africa's Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ebrahim Ebrahim, announced that, "the recall of Ambassador Ismail Coovadia is to show our strongest condemnation of the attack. This recent Israeli aggression of attacking the aid flotilla severely impacts on finding a lasting solution to the problems of the region. The South African government also joins the international community in its call for the siege of Gaza to be immediately lifted." Ebrahim added that the siege had brought "untold hardships" to the ordinary people of Gaza, making their lives "nightmarish".