By Abdul Rahman Al-Haj
Two key features characterise the Syrian Salafis. Initially, the Salafis called for non-violence, as a result of the repression that the regime had imposed on the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s. They then transformed to become Salafi jihadists, as a reaction to the regime's military repression of peaceful demonstrations.
By Afro-Middle East Centre
Prior to the 2011 uprisings, the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was influential in Jordan’s politics and society. The Brotherhood participated in elections, ran social institutions, and was one of very few organisations that was able to straddle the Jordanian–Palestinian identity divide. The uprisings initially augmented its powers, and in 2011 and 2012 the Brotherhood widened its appeal, organising large protests. However the nature of the Jordanian political system, the stance of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Brotherhood’s decision not to participate in Jordan’s elections have since severely diminished its influence. The Brotherhood is now undergoing a process of introspection and, in the light of the GCC decision to declare it a terrorist organisation, it is reasserting its support for the monarch in an attempt to remain viable relevant.
By Dr. Mohsen Saleh
Fear of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanal-Muslimoon), the leading Islamist movement, has gained unprecedented international prominence since the beginning of the Arab uprisings. Outside official institutions this fear is most commonly found among liberal or ‘leftist’ figures. Western media also reflect common concerns about the Brotherhood that have been expressed by politicians in both Israel and the United States.
By Rafiq Habib
The 3 July military coup in Egypt had a number of key objectives. By it, the military attempted to entrench its position in the state, regardless of who holds power. It further sought to restore the networks of the previous regime to the political scene. By becoming a key governance partner with the elected power, the military seeks to place the deep state under central command and to ensure a centralisation of the intelligence services. The goal was to establish a secular alliance that was loyal to the former regime. This would enable the networks of the former regime to mobilise under a political veneer provided by secular forces. In order to achieve some of these objectives, the armed forces worked together with friendly western countries, especially the USA.
By Afro-Middle East Centre
It is now widely acknowledged that the 3 July ouster of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Mursi, constituted a military coup. Events following the coup have sought to reset Egypt’s policies back to what they were during the Mubarak era, underscoring the suggestion that a counter revolution was successfully instituted. The Egyptian constitution was suspended, the Shura Council – the upper house of parliament –was disbanded, and various Islamist leaders – from the Muslim Brotherhood and other parties – were arrested. Moreover, media deemed to be sympathetic to Mursi were shut down, and the decades-long state of emergency was reinstituted. Further, the army selected a judge previously appointed to the constitutional court by Mubarak, Adli Mansour, as interim president, and an interim cabinet dominated by Mubarak-era holdovers. The aftermath of the coup also saw a shift in foreign policy: a more belligerent attitude towards the USA, greater friendliness with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, and a hardline attitude towards Palestinians – with the Rafah border being almost permanently shut, and ninety per cent of the Egypt to Gaza tunnels being destroyed. In short, the coup has had and is set to have significant domestic, regional and global consequences.