By Afro-Middle East Centre

As various parties to the Syrian crisis, including the United Nations, Russia, and the United States, prepare for ‘proximity talks’ to take place this week, and as UN Special Envoy Stefan de Mistura attempts to put a positive face to a ceasefire he oversaw, it was clear within twenty-four hours of the ceasefire going into effect that it would not hold. Within the first week of the ceasefire a total of 135 people were killed according to one monitoring group, although the real number is likely to be much higher.

The cessation of hostilities between Bashar al-Asad’s regime and a selection of opposition groups took effect on 27 February. The ceasefire was orchestrated by Russia and the USA, co-chairs of the seventeen-member International Syria Support Group (ISSG). The joint US-Russian communiqué regarding the aims and logistics of the ceasefire noted that Islamic State group (IS) and al-Qa'ida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra were not included in the ceasefire agreement, and mandated that a US-Russian-led ISSG Ceasefire Task Force would be responsible for identifying IS- and Jabhat-controlled territory for continued airstrikes. The communiqué also committed all parties to ensure the safe passage of aid to areas requiring it. Within twenty-four hours of the ceasefire having gone into force, however, Russian aircraft are believed to have bombed targets in Hama province around the village of Herbanafsa, where rebels associated with the powerful Jaish al-Fatah faction are operating. In Darkosh, Idlib province, where Ahrar al-Sham (AAS) rebels are in control, the ceasefire is also not holding. Throughout the week following the signing of the ceasefire agreement, suspected Russian aircraft continued to pound villages allegedly linked to JAN and IS and those controlled by the Free Syrian Army, which is a party to the ceasefire. Due to international and regional actors putting their geostrategic goals ahead of promoting a complete winding down of hostilities, the ceasefire is incomplete and is barely holding even in its targeted areas.

The communiqué notes that the identification of armed groups will be based on UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Paragraph 8 of the resolution obligates UN member states to suppress ‘terrorist acts committed specifically by…entities associated with Al Qa'ida or ISIL’. A number of groups so identified by this resolution are backed by the USA – either directly or indirectly through its allies in Ankara, Doha and Riyadh. The powerful components of the Jaish al-Fatah coalition, such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jaish al-Islam, are backed by Riyadh, received training through CIA programmes, and were invited to form part of the Saudi-backed Higher Negotiation Committee. Ahrar al-Sham and Jaish al-Islam have occasionally fought alongside Jabhat al-Nusra, and also alongside Free Syrian Army-linked units, notably in the eastern Damascene suburbs. Ahrar al-Sham’s position on various issues has been particularly ambivalent. It aims to present itself as moderate and accommodating in various Arab media forums, while also stating that it will not abide by any ceasefire, and pledging support for Jabhat al-Nusra. The group opportunistically allies itself with al-Nusra in areas where IS and the Syrian forces pose a threat, while decrying Nusra’s exclusionary Salafism on the international stage to avoid being labelled a terrorist outfit.

Such tactics have provided Russia with the excuse to continue bombing ‘terrorists’. Meanwhile, Riyadh and Washington see groups such as Ahrar al-Sham as a counterweight to IS and regard them as battle hardened enough to be able to hold ground against the Syrian army. Turkey and Saudi Arabia will likely continue arming and funding certain groups within Jaish al-Fatah; Riyadh hopes to bolster its main proxy groups as the war enters a new and more unpredictable phase. Ankara hopes to strengthen groups that can win political and military victories against the Kurds. The ambition of the most powerful Syrian Kurdish armed group, the Peoples Protection Units (YPG), is to link the Kurdish cantons of Efrin with other Kurdish cantons ofCizire and Kobani by a strip of Syrian territory disputed between various rebel groups and IS. By linking these three cantons the PYD-YPG would be able to forge a contiguous Kurdish-controlled territory in order to entrench its social project and block supply routes to Jabhat al-Nusra, IS and other rebel groups. Ankara views this ambition as a direct attack on its security and foreign policy goals in Syria; an autonomous Kurdish area on its southern border could provide the armed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has renewed hostilities with the Turkish state, with a safe haven. Furthermore; any experiment in autonomy could provide inspiration to Turkey’s own restless Kurdish population. Turkey has therefore been shelling YPG positions along the border and threatened intervention into Syria – which is unlikely given the strong involvement of Russia.

Another important element of the ceasefire communiqué is the humanitarian aspect. Parties to the ceasefire are obliged to ‘allow humanitarian agencies rapid, unhindered and sustained access throughout areas under their control’. UN and partner aid agencies had planned to deliver life-saving aid to 154 000 civilians this week, but even this is subject to the politics of the groups involved, with many areas still subject to air raids. The siege of Deir al-Zor, wherein 200 000 people are trapped, continues because IS, which controls that territory, is not part of the agreement; and airdrops which were meant to ease the plight of the besieged inhabitants have been missing their targets.

De Mistura expressed hope that increased aid to besieged areas and a lull in the violence could set the stage for the revival of the halted Geneva peace talks. He wants ‘proximity talks’ to begin on 10 March. It is likely that the Syrian regime will attempt to create a situation on the ground before then that will grant them maximum negotiating power. Riyadh and Ankara, meanwhile, will look at ways to prop up rebel factions in order to both block both an Iranian diplomatic coup and a roll back of Kurdish goals.

What is the Islamic State? Expert Omar Shaukat explains all.

Paris attacks: Omar Shaukat

  • Jul 19, 2019
  • Published in Videos

The Islamic State militant group Isis - based in Syria and Iraq - claimed responsibility for the Paris attacks. It said the attacks were to punish France for its involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and for its attitude to Islam.

By Afro-Middle East Centre

Russia’s military involvement in Syria, from the beginning of its aerial bombing on 30 September until the launch of cruise missiles its ships in the Caspian Sea on 7 October, has raised numerous questions about its intentions. Is Russia’s aim in Syria totargetpthe Islamic State group (IS) and pre-emptively eliminate IS Chechen fighters before they return to their homes, as it claims? Or has Russia entered Syria simply toprotect and bolster the Damascus government? And, if Russia continues its military activities in Syria at this level, could its intervention turn into another quagmire like Afghanistan was for the Soviet Union.

The question of whether Russia’s primary objective is to target IS or bolster the Syrian government is based on a false binary from the Syrian and Russia perspectives. Russia has repeatedly ridiculed the idea that there are ‘moderate’ rebels, and has labelled all insurgents as ‘terrorists’, as has been the Syrian government position since the uprising began in 2011. Russia even asked USA to share intelligence on rebels that might be battling IS, ostensibly to avoid targeting them.
Perhaps more important than determining Russian intentions is pondering how otherprotagonists in the Syrian conflict will respond to the latest Russian move. Russia’s bravado is on display; what is unclear is how countries that make up the broad coalition against the Syrian regime – the USA, Turkey, Saudi Arabia (and, to a lesser extent, Qatar, UAE and Jordan) – will respond to Russia’s intervention. Will these states support the Syrian rebels in a manner that will allow them to resist the renewed spirit in the Syrian Arab Army (and various other pro-regime militias), reinvigorated as they are by Russian support?
US response
If Ukraine is any precedent, and considering the general tendency of the US Obama administration in this second presidential term, the USA will not respond to Russian aggression by significantly increasing its support for the rebels. In fact, with all its talk about ‘deconfliction’, the USA is more interested in keeping out of Russia’s way in Syria, while attempting to develop an alternate strategy to confront IS, after having spectacularly failed previously.
Turkey’s response
Following the Russian entry into the Syrian battlefield, Turkey will have to rethink its role and re-evaluate whether it can support the Syrian insurgency in a manner that the latter might be able to confront the Russians. Despite Turkey having been at odds with Russia for a large part of their history, the ruling party, the AKP is in a precarioussituation with a new parliamentary election in less than a month, and an electorate that has to be won over. Further, it is dealing with a renewed Kurdish insurgency led by Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) that has the potential to destabilise parts of Turkey. Also influencing Turkey’s deliberations will be economic and energy ties with Russia that strengthened recently. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has hinted that he is willing to reconsider the agreement with Russia on its building the first Turkish nuclear power plant, and also hurting it economically by refusing to buy natural gas from Russia. However, though a change on either of these issues will hurt both Russia and Turkey, the latter will be affected much more than the former. But most importantly, even if Turkey does scale back its economic relations with Russia, it is not clear that this will translate into a greater military commitment towards the Syrian rebels.
Saudi Arabia’s response
Saudi Arabia is in a different situation to Turkey. Since it does not share a border with Syria, its support for Syrian rebels depends on its coordination with Turkey and Jordan over what these countries are prepared to allow along their borders with Syria. Any stronger Saudi rhetoric about supporting Syrian rebels needs, therefore, to be checked against this reality. Second, Saudi Arabia, like Turkey, is tackling numerous problems domestically – such as an increased IS threat within its borders, and the Houthi insurgency in Yemen which, even if pacified in Yemen’s south, will continue to pose a threat along the Yemeni-Saudi border. These factors will likely undermine the Saudi appetite for further fuelling the Syrian insurgency.
But herein lies another dilemma for Saudi Arabia. If it does not increase support for the insurgency, Saudi IS and al-Qa'ida sympathisers will likely be swayed by the argument that their government is an ‘apostate’ regime, and that they are obligated to fight ‘jihad’ against the Russians (also, Syrians and Iranians), thus creating a greater security threat within Saudi Arabia. There are already opinions being voiced in this direction. On the other hand, if Saudi Arabia increases its support for Syrian rebels, such support must be effective enough to force the Russians to withdraw, and to topple the Asad regime. Anything less than that will effectively be a victory for the Syrian regime. With Russians now backing the Syrian government, a rebel victory requires Saudi Arabia to either involve its own military in Syria or sufficiently equip the rebels with anti-aircraft weapons that can be effective against Russian aircraft. Neither of these is realistic, and, therefore, it will not be a surprise if Saudi Arabia accepts the Russian campaign as an invitation to de-escalate its support for the Syrian insurgency.
Conclusion
This, obviously, does not mean that the Syrian rebels will put down their weapons, even if their foreign backers, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and USA cease their support. What it means is that the Russian initiative to form a Syrian contact group – which would include USA, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt – might lead to some political reconciliation in which the militarily exhausted rebel groups will be included in a transitional process to give the impression that the Syrian conflict is winding down.
This, however, presupposes that the rebels’ foreign supporters, especially Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are looking to reduce the bloodshed in Syria. That has not, thus far, been the predominant tendency with any of the protagonists in the Syrian conflict; most parties have been bent on bleeding their adversary into submission. It therefore remains to be seen whether the Russian intervention in Syria will force a change in this calculus or entrench the current sensibilities even further.

By Afro-Middle East Centre

In a much-anticipated speech on Wednesday, US president Barack Obama unveiled his strategy for confronting the Islamic State group (IS). He emphasised the need for an international coalition supporting the efforts of Iraqi forces and Syrian rebels through airstrikes and logistical support inside Iraq and Syria. The US administration had already been working on the formation of an international coalition. The recent NATO summit resulted in a ten-nation alliance against IS, and US secretary of state, John Kerry, has also been trying to build an Arab consensus against IS. That move was pre-empted by an Arab League resolution earlier this week announcing Arab states’ willingness to support international efforts against IS. Additionally, the United Nations Security Council had unanimously adopted resolution 2170 in August, which called on member states to prevent the movement of terrorists and their obtaining arms or finances.

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