by Mohammed Cherkaoui
Several puzzling questions have emerged in the volatile Arab geopolitical environment after two major developments occurred within less than forty-eight hours of each other in the last week of April.
First, Yemen’s main southern separatist group, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), decided to establish self-rule in areas it controlled, to impose emergency law in the city of Aden and in all southern governorates, and to take control of Aden’s port, airport and other state institutions such as the central bank. The Saudi-backed government warned that these measures would have ‘catastrophic consequences’. An armed unit of the STC fought to wrest control of Socotra’s provincial capital, Hadibo, from forces loyal to President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who is backed by Saudi Arabia.
Second, retired general, Khalifa Haftar, asserted that his Libyan National Army (LNA) had a ‘popular mandate’ to rule Libya, and vowed to intensify his assault to seize Tripoli. In a televised address on his Libya al-Hadath television channel, he announced, ‘The general command is answering the will of the people, despite the heavy burden and the many obligations and the size of the responsibility, and we will be subject to the people’s wish.’ He also declared ‘the end of the Skhirat Agreement’, a 2015 UN-mediated deal that consolidated Libya’s government. Haftar vowed his forces would work ‘to put in place the necessary conditions to build the permanent institutions of a civil state’. He did not specify whether the House of Representatives in Tobruk, eastern Libya, would support his plans.
These moves represent two strategic shifts in Yemeni and Libyan geopolitics, amidst global health concerns of the coronavirus pandemic, and despite the religious norms of a truce during the fasting month of Ramadan. The moves by Yemen’s STC and Libya’s Haftar suggest the strong role of certain regional powers, rather than simply internal differences between local stakeholders. The fragile balance of power seems to be proceeding along the strategy of some regional players, notably the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which have pursued an opportunistic form of political realism. The UAE has relied on the logic of military power by supporting armed proxies, and has ignored international agreements and diplomatic efforts of the UN to reach solutions that would be accepted by all parties in the Yemeni and Libyan crises.
The UAE appears to be accelerating the pace towards full control of southern Yemen and its ports, especially Aden and Socotra, to help enhance its maritime trade and expand its influence in the Red Sea region. It also hopes to expand its political investment in oil-rich Libya, and its strategic position on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. It competes with another regional power, Turkey, which has supported the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez Sarraj in Tripoli, and has provided technological and tactical backing for GNA-aligned militias. In early May 2020, armed clashes in western Libya stopped Haftar’s forces from advancing, and reversed their course of action in certainstrategic areas.
Haftar’s unilateral declaration of a ‘popular mandate’ – similar to a declaration by Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi when he announced his coup against a democratically-elected president – and intention of imposing de facto authority in Libya, have serious ramifications, and indicate what could be a third legitimacy crisis in the last six years. Haftar’s plans further threaten to escalate the crisis, which the UN Secretary General regards as a ‘proxy war’. Another diplomatic puzzle is the future of the Libyan Political Agreement, also known as the Skhirat Agreement, signed on 17 December 2015 in Skhirat, Morocco.
After a 31-month tenure as UN special envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salamé submitted his resignation to the UN Secretary General, António Guterres, for ‘health reasons’, on 2 March 2020. His decision implied deep frustration in his pursuit of more two and a half years ‘to unite Libyans, prevent foreign intervention, and preserve the unity of the country’. The Trump administration has refused to vote for the appointment of former Algerian foreign minister Ramtane Lamamra to replace Salamé. The US mission to the UN gave no further explanation for opposing Lamamra, who served as Algeria’s foreign minister (2013-2017) and as African Union commissioner for peace and security (2008-2013). He also served as Algeria’s ambassador to the United Nations and the United States in mid-1990s. He is considered an experienced diplomat and has been a mediator in several African conflicts, notably in Liberia.
This two-part paper examines what seems to be the dynamo factor, or driving force, of the Libyan conflict: fluctuation and reconstruction of political legitimacy. Since the summer of 2014, two battles over legitimacy have spoiled Libyan politics and weakened the UN mediation with two rounds of international recognition of one new political institution or another. Both institutions have required separate budgets for the oil revenues for their rival entities and their respective governments, and claimed distant interpretations of ‘legitimacy’ in the eyes of Libyans and the rest of the world. Moreover, most of the political process and interaction with either the United Nations or foreign governments have been constrained by an ego-inflated dilemma of personal animosity between four particular figures with opposite views, scopes of power, and foreign affiliations.
The paper also probes into the struggle of the UN diplomacy, which passed its eighth-year mark on 16 September 2019. It examines four main factors. First, the construction of a double-edged legitimacy of two competing institutions: House of Representatives in Tobruk with its government housed in Bayda versus GNA in Tripoli. Second, the foreign interference of certain countries, like Egypt, UAE, Turkey, Qatar, France, and Russia, and the United States have pursued tilting the already flimsy balance of power on the ground in favour one player against another. Third, The Libyan conflict has been subject to several diplomatic initiatives by the African Union (AU), the Arab League (AL), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the European Union (EU). For instance, the AU initiative opted for a non-removal policy of the Qaddafi regime, but committed to a ‘reform process and a political transition’.Fourth, the mismatch between the discourse of ‘national unity’ and the discourse of ‘counter-terrorism’ since General Haftar has pledged to ‘cleanse’ the western part of the country from the perceived ‘terrorists’. The paper draws on my study of the Libyan case among other Arab conflicts, my previous writings, and fieldwork while serving on the UN Panel of Experts.
Bargaining with bullets
Libya has endured bloody confrontations, foreign manipulation, uncompromising diplomacy, and an open-ended stalemate. These challenges seem to have exhausted the UN nine-year diplomatic manoeuvring of the Libyan conflict. The overall scene presents Libya as synonymous with violence, lawlessness and statelessness, while lurking at the border between a ‘fragile state’ and a ‘failed state’. Libya represents a typical scenario of the gap between the normativity of the UN mediation and the realist strategic bet of foreign stakeholders on their armed proxies in the field. The nine-year UN mediation has been outperformed by cycles of diplomatic overtures in Tunis, Skhirat, Geneva, Paris, Palermo, Abu Dhabi, Moscow, and Berlin, followed by new rounds of fierce infighting on the ground between the Tripoli- Tobruk camps. In his book ‘International Mediation in Civil Wars’, Timothy Desk points to the transnational flow of weapons, resources, and ideas, which ‘means that when civil wars today end, they are more likely to do so at the negotiating table than on the battlefield’.
In the early 1990s, Edward Azar, one of the forefathers of Conflict Resolution, developed his nuanced theoretical framework of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) as a culmination of four main clusters which leads to violent conflict: ‘communal content’, ‘human needs’, ‘governance and state’s role’, and ‘international linkages’. He expects these conflicts to occur ‘when communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of the communal identity. However, the deprivation is the result of a complex causal chain involving the role of the state and the pattern of international linkages.’ Consequently, the interests of foreign players tend to suppress the desire for reconciliation among internal contenders. In most instances, those international linkages dictate the internal policy along two types of subordination: economic dependency and client relationships.
Prior to the UN General Assembly held in New York in September 2019, Haftar’s forces faced tough resistance in their attempt to capture the capital, Tripoli, from the Government of National Accord. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported that the fighting between pro-GNA and pro-Haftar forces killed at least 1 093 people, wounded 5 752, and forced some 120 000 into displacement. Former UN envoy Ghassan Salamé told the UN Human Rights Council the conflict had spread outside Tripoli with air and drone attacks against the port city of Misrata, Sirte, and Jufra in central Libya. He expressed concern as ‘the conflict risks escalating to full-blown civil war… It is fanned by widespread violations of the UN arms embargo by all parties and external actors.’
Consequently, the philosophy of the UN Resolution 1973 (March 2011) which established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), has gone astray. UNSMIL emerged with the aim of ‘find[ing] a peaceful and sustainable solution’ to the crisis, and, most recently, Resolution 2376 (2017), has extended the mission mandate for mediation and provision of good offices, including (since December 2015) supporting the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement. There have been recurring themes of ‘promising’ dialogue and ‘imminent’ reconciliation, proposed by six consecutive UN special envoys: Abdelilah Khatib (2011), Ian Martin (2011-2012), Tarek Mitri (2012-2014), Bernardino León (2014-2015), Martin Kobler (2015-2017), and Ghassan Salamé (June 2017- March 2020).
The struggle of the United Nations diplomacy in Libya represents one of several challenges of international mediation in contemporary Arab conflicts. The protracted Libyan conflict remains a snapshot of several deadlocks, which have undermined the United Nations mediation and desired political transition in the North African oil-rich country after the fall of Qaddafi regime. In his concluding chapter in the 2018 Davos edition ‘The Future of Politics’, politician-turned-Harvard scholar, Nicholas Burns, wrote: ‘Nearly all of the Middle East’s twenty-two Arab countries are worse off, not better off… Stability and hope in the region are in very short supply. Four important Arab countries – Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria – are essentially “failed states”. Libya’s warring tribes continue to contest for power with the outcome doubtful.’
UNSMIL as a wishful platform of UN mediation
The most recent SC Resolution 2486 (2019) was adopted on 12 September 2019, to keep UNSMIL operational until 15 September 2020, and recognised that ‘since 30 March 2016 UNSMIL has gradually established a consistent presence in Libya, and welcomes UNSMIL’s progress in re-establishing a presence in Tripoli, Benghazi and other parts of Libya, as security conditions allow. This presence inside Libya was impossible for nearly eight years of UNSMIL’s existence. The United Nations peace-making efforts between the two rival parliaments and governments gained some short-lived momentum after brokering, as mentioned earlier, the power-sharing Libyan Political Agreement, in December 2015. Yet, the deal soon ran into difficulties and ushered in a new phase in the conflict.’
The frequency of infighting between the western and eastern camps, not ignoring several rogue militias, has derailed both political and humanitarian progress, if one considers the dilemma of slavery, detention, and abuse of sub-Saharan migrants. So far, UN diplomacy remains sandwiched between the interpretative legitimacy as a political construct, bestowed on the former by the international community under the Skhirat process, and the claimed military ‘determinism’ of the latter.
In his briefing to the Security Council on 4 September 2019, then-UN envoy, Ghassan Salamé, stated, ‘Many Libyans feel abandoned by part of the international community and exploited by others.’ He also warned of two ‘highly unpalatable scenarios’ if the Council and broader international community fail to support an immediate end to the conflict — either a persistent and low-intensity conflict with continued fratricide among Libyans, or a doubling down of military support to one side or the other by their external patrons, resulting in a sharp escalation and regional chaos.
UN chief, António Guterres, has publicly condemned ‘the descent of Libya into political uncertainty and armed hostilities during the reporting period as deeply alarming.’ He also remains concerned about the impact on civilians of the shelling of residential areas and about the reports of targeted attacks and the destruction of vital infrastructure. By the end of 2019, Salamé was cynical of the external support, which was ‘instrumental in the intensification of airstrikes’, and ‘imported weaponry is being accompanied by foreign personnel working as pilots, trainers and technicians’. In Europe, four well-publicised meetings were held, one in Paris and another in Palermo, to reach a Libyan reconciliation in 2018, a third in Moscow and a fourth in Berlin in early 2020. However, they failed to bring about any diplomatic breakthrough.
Detractors of the UN in Libya
With the open-ended cycle of violence, the death toll, and civilian suffering in Libya, new questions arise now about the pragmatism of intervention: can the United Nations, at this point, avoid more civilian fatalities, provide humanitarian assistance for millions of internally-displaced persons and refugees, or guide any mechanism of peaceful transition into stability in Libya, and other those failed states like Yemen, Syria, and Iraq? What would be the minimum expectation from the UN now?
There might be some alternative approaches to what I term a good-enough paradigm of conflict management, however, affected civilians and concerned public opinion are hopeful of effective frameworks of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. In January 2018, in his remarks to the Security Council, Salamé explained how the complexity of the Libyan crisis pivoted around a conflict over resources. He then reiterated his UNSMIL team’s commitment to three fundamental objectives: a) adopting a new constitution as a permanent legal framework, b) reformulating a Libyan national polity, and c) holding general elections while more than two million Libyans have put their names on the electoral register. As stated previously, ‘the majority of Libyans feel less enthusiastic and believe the current deadlock is too strong to make any real political overtures. The only political momentum in Libya at present is the United Nations’ search for a new impetus among rival centres of power, including the militias. However, leaders of political and military rival groups are reluctant to engage in the UN process or to commit to any final decision.’
UN diplomacy seems to be undergoing a period of fatigue. It has apparently exhausted its energy in searching for efficient formulas of conflict transformation, in fact, on fully-fledged conflict resolution. The UN literature asserts, ‘When an effective mediation process is hampered, other efforts may be required to contain the conflict or to mitigate the human suffering, but there should be constant efforts to remain engaged so as to identify and seize possible windows of opportunity for mediation in the future.’ So far, six UN envoys have experimented with a variety of mediation techniques and combined their institutional guidelines with their personal touch in managing the Libyan conflict. Any revision of these approaches should take into consideration four main challenges:
As mentioned in the introduction, two battles over legitimacy, or two legitimation crises, have spoiled Libyan politics and UN mediation with two rounds of international recognition of one new political institution or another. German philosopher and sociologist, Jurgen Habermas, conceptualises a legitimation crisis as ‘an identity crisis that results from a loss of confidence in administrative institutions, which occurs despite the fact that they still retain legal authority by which to govern.’
I joined the UN Panel of Experts on Libya less than three months after the general elections of June 25, 2014, which gave birth to the House of Representatives in Tobruk, and later, the first government in Bayda led by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani. The turnout was very low at 18 per cent, while most candidates ran as independents. Nationalist and liberal factions gained momentum by securing the majority of seats, whereas the Islamist groups’ representation shrunk to around 30 seats. There was common interpretation that the Islamist forces faced ‘a devastating loss at the ballot box, and now face a genuine existential threat’. The ballot results triggered several reactions nationally and internationally. The majority of Libyans, the new parliament, and the international community, would expect the Islamists ‘to accept the will of the Libya people expressed through the ballot box, and to refrain from using unorthodox tactics, such as using armed militias to influence the political process.’
The United Nations swiftly recognised the HoR as ‘the only legitimately elected legislature’. Then-UN envoy, Tarek Mitri, attended its inaugural session in Tobruk on 4 August 2014, and later expressed some regret in his report to the Security Council. He wrote, ‘Many efforts, including ours, to arrive at an agreement over procedural and related issues failed to ensure full participation of all elected members. A number of representatives decided to boycott the sessions. Underlining the importance of safeguarding Libya’s fragile transition, with the House of Representatives as the only legitimately elected legislature, we affirmed that every effort must be exerted towards enabling parliamentarians, who boycott the House of Representatives, to join their colleagues.’
However, the political elite of the west and their Misrata fighters’ supporters, with links to Operation Dawn, did not accept the emergence of HoR as Libya’s new legislative assembly in lieu of the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC). A new war of narratives erupted between the two political camps, and the conflict over the constitutionality of HoR became a wider legal battle before the Supreme Court. Throughout the summer of 2014, the gap deepened between the two de facto parliaments and rival governments over political legitimacy and control of the country’s vast energy reserves. In ancient Greece, Aristotle argued that the legitimacy of the government relied upon constitutionalism and consent, but also posited that political stability relied upon the legitimacy of rewards.
In early November 2014, the Supreme Court invalidated the election of the HoR, and stated that the Election Law Committee ‘had violated Libya’s provisional constitution’. The Court verdict led to celebrations in the streets of Tripoli, as it meant the non-constitutionality of HoR in Tobruk. Nouri Abusahmain, then-head of GNC, told reporters, ‘We, the General National Congress, call for dialogue. A dialogue serves national reconciliation, stability and development.’ However, HoR rejected the Court’s decision arguing it was made ‘at gunpoint’ with the court being controlled by armed militias. The UNSMIL team was taken by surprise, and the gist of its reaction was ‘an urgent need for all parties to forge consensus on political arrangements’. Consequently, the Tripoli-Tobruk political rivalry and emergence of Haftar, as the ‘strong man’ of the east, have had a negative impact on the UN mediation efforts.
A second reconstructed legitimacy emerged between November 2014 and October 2015. The UN mediation focused on multi-track, cross-elite, cross-tribe negotiations held in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Bernardino León, then-head of UNSMIL, engaged in some shuttle diplomacy between HoR and GNC around a compromise with Sarraj. By mid-October, he secured the initial acceptance of both sides of a revised version of a framework of power sharing. The diplomatic breakthrough was celebrated on October 17 in Morocco by signing the new Libyan Political Agreement.
The new agreement established a nine-member Presidency Council and a seventeen-member interim Government of National Accord, with the aim of holding new elections within two years (October 2015-October 2017). It also maintained the continuity of HoR as a legislature and advisory body, to be known as the ‘High Council of State’. This shift represented the best possible scenario of national unity and positive engagement of several stakeholders. The Agreement introduction reads, ‘Members from all these three legislative bodies made very important contributions to the dialogue process and to the conclusion of this agreement. Other independent stakeholders participated as well. The armed groups, municipal councils, political parties, tribal leaders, and women’s organizations contributed to other elements of the dialogue to promote a genuine and stable reconciliation.’ The Security Council announced its support of the Government of National Accord as ‘the sole legitimate government of Libya’, and stressed, ‘a Government of National Accord that should be based in the capital Tripoli is urgently needed to provide Libya with the means to maintain governance, promote stability and economic development.’
In the following two years, the military open-ended Karama (Dignity) operation, led by General Haftar, has scaled back the diplomatic hopes of the United Nations. The battle over legitimacy is not only political Tobruk and Tripoli, but also entails the complexity of the military-civilian relations in the country. Haftar is a good example of how certain military figures tend to flex their muscles in the field, intimidate the political will of Sarraj, and impose their fait accompli at every turn of the negotiating process. By mid-December 2017, he declared the Skhirat agreement ‘void’. So far, Haftar’s intention is ‘to seize, rather than share’, as he believes that ‘power can come as no surprise’.
Several factors have solidified these disputing constructs of legitimacy: electoral legitimacy, international legitimacy, military legitimacy, and others. The International Crisis Group has noticed that, ‘While international rifts and competing regional ambitions remain an overarching conflict driver, locally, interlocking competing narratives of political and military legitimacy, a battle for power, tribal rifts and recriminations, and a deeply polarized media are making the war even more intractable.’
Part 2 of the paper will address the impact of international links in Libya, the question of parallel or rival diplomacies, what is behind the counterterrorism discourse, and some concluding remarks.
* Dr Mohammed Cherkaoui is a professor of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University in Washington DC and former member of the United Nations Panel of Experts.
 Mohammed Ghobari, Mohammed Mokhashef (2020). ‘Yemen separatists announce self-rule in south, complicating peace efforts’, Reuters, 26 April, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-south/yemen-separatis…
 DW News (2020). ‘Libya: Khalifa Haftar declares “popular mandate,” end to 2015 UN agreement’. DW, 27 April, https://www.dw.com/en/libya-khalifa-haftar-declares-popular-mandate-end…
 Peter Bartu (2014). ‘Libya’s Political Transition: The Challenges of Mediation’, International Peace Institute, December.
 Timothy D Sisk (2008). International Mediation in Civil Wars: Bargaining with Bullets, Routledge.
 Edward E Azar (1990). The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, Dartmouth Pub Co.
 Aljazeera News (2019). ‘Libya’s Khalifa Haftar says open to dialogue as fighting drags on,’ 29 September, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/libya-khalifa-haftar-open-dialog…
 Aljazeera News (2019). ‘Libya’s Khalifa Haftar says open to dialogue as fighting drags on’.
 Nicholas Burns (2018). ‘An Outlook on Global Politics’, in The Future of Politics, Credit Suisse, 2018 Davos edition.
 Lisa Watanabe (2019). ‘UN Mediation in Libya: Peace Still a Distant Prospect,’ CSS Analyses in Security Policy, No. 246, June.
 UN News (2019). ‘International Meeting Essential to Getting Libya-led Political Process Back on Track, Ending Conflict, Special Representative Tells Security Council’, Security Council 8611TH, 4 September.
 António Guterres (2019). ‘United Nations Support Mission in Libya Report of the Secretary-General’, S2019/682, 26 August.
 Ghassan Salamé (2019). ‘With Libyans now “fighting the wars of others” inside their own country, UN envoy urges Security Council action to end violence’, UN News, July 29, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/07/1043381
 Mohammed Cherkaoui (2018). ‘Fits and Starts Characterize UN Mediation in Yemen, Syria, and Libya’. Arab Center DC, 7 February, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/fits-and-starts-characterize-un…
 Habermas, Jürgen (1975). Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press.
 Mohamed Eljarh (2014). ‘Libya’s Islamists Go for Broke’, Foreign Policy, 22 July, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/22/libyas-islamists-go-for-broke/
 Mohamed Eljarh (2014). ‘Libya’s Islamists Go for Broke’.
 Tarek Mitri (2014). ‘Security Council Briefing’, 27 August, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/SRSG%20SC%20briefing%…
 Tarek Mitri (2014). ‘Security Council Briefing’, 27 August.
 Morris Zelditch, Jr (2001). ‘Theories of Legitimacy’, in Jost, John; Major, Brenda (eds), The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations. Cambridge University Press, 38.
 Reuters (2014). ‘Libya faces chaos as top court rejects elected assembly’, 6 November, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-parliament/libya-face…
 Reuters (2014). ‘Libya faces chaos as top court rejects elected assembly’.
 Aljazeera News (2014). ‘Libyan court rules elected parliament illegal’, 7 November, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/11/libyan-court-suspends…
 Reuters (2014). ‘Libya faces chaos as top court rejects elected assembly’, 6 November, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-parliament/libya-face…
 Paul Taylor (2019). ‘France’s Double Game in Libya’, POLITICO, 17 April, https://www.politico.eu/article/frances-double-game-in-libya-nato-un-kh…
 International Crisis Group (2019). ‘Avoiding a Protracted Conflict in Libya’, 22 July, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/avoiding-protracted-conflict-libya
The recent and ongoing Saudi-Emirati offensive on the Yemeni port city of Hudaida will render UN special envoy Martin Griffiths’s ‘new’ solution to the five-year-long Yemeni crisis difficult to implement. The partial success of the Hudaida offensive has already emboldened the UAE to demand the return of the city to troops aligned to Yemen’s president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. As Griffiths engages the different players, it is likely that the Houthi, who currently control the port city, will be willing eventually to hand Hudaida over to a third party. Griffiths alluded to this when he referred to his meetings with Houthi officials as ‘fruitful’. This despite the group’s initial rejection of the envoy’s proposal. Clearly, the devastating military hardware supplied by Saudi Arabia and the UAE confronted the group with insurmountable odds, and it has reevaluated its position.
Griffiths will, however, likely face pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which insist that Hudaida be transferred to their direct control, and that UNSC resolution 2216, which calls for Houthi disarmament, be the basis for negotiations. Their belligerence is fuelled by the lack of consequences for their offensive, which has been condemned by the United Nations and most global powers.
Before the Hudaida offensive commenced on 12 June, Griffiths had been meeting roleplayers in an attempt to formulate an enduring solution to the current impasse. His solution closely resembledthe 2016 Kuwait and Kerry initiatives, and called for a ceasefire that would end with the disarmament of the Houthi. The major difference between his proposal and the other two was that he proposed a unity government be formed before disarmament. Other issues, including reconciliation, the status of southern Yemen, and the holding of elections were to be decided in a second phase. Disagreements over the ceasefire and the handover of Hudaida to a third party aborted his initiative. Saudi Arabia and the UAE had previously insisted that the port be handed over to a third party without commensurately agreeing to lift the blockade on Sana'a airport. Significantly, UNSC resolution 2216, adopted in April 2015, ratified Hadi as Yemen’s president and advocated Houthi disarmament and withdrawal. This resolution remains skewed and unrepresentative of the balance of forces, but Saudi Arabia and the UAE insist on it as a basis for negotiations, thus ensuring that no initiative can succeed.
Hudaida is a strategic port through which northern Yemen receives over seventy per cent of its aid; the Saudi coalition has been plotting its capture for two years. The plan to take the city is consistent with the UAE’s recent attempts to secure controlof ports along both the Asian and African sides of the Red Sea. In Yemen alone, Abu Dhabi controls the port of Mukallah, Mocha and Aden, and has significant influence in Socotra; in the Horn of Africa it controlsthe ports of Assab (Eritrea), Berbera (Somaliland/Somalia) and Bosaso (Somalia), and had previously attempted to control Djibouti’s main port.
Fearing that Saudi-Emirati control of Hudaida would halt aid to northern Yemen, the international community had previously scuppered an attack on the city. Significantly, even the USA, in Donald Trump’s first year as president, refused to endorse the operation, and refused to supply Saudi Arabia with military hardware required to detect and remove sea mines and land-sea missiles that have prevented Saudi-backed forces from being able to amphibiously dock in the port.
However, on 12 June, Saudi- and Emirati-supported troops commenced their operation to capture Hudaida, despite warnings from the UNSC, which condemned the offensive and unsuccessfully attempted mediation talks the day before. Worryingly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE forced Yemen’s exiled president, Hadi, to endorse the offensive when it seemed that the international community would not. Under duress, he supported it, believing that his failure to do so would not halt UAE actions, but would, instead, allow the Emiratis to control Hudaida in the same way that they control Aden. Hadi’s lesson from Aden goes back to January when UAE-supported forces routed troops aligned to him. In February 2017, the UAE even forcefully prevented Hadi, a southerner and the internationally-recognised president of Yemen who the UAE supposedly supports, from returning to the region. He was allowed to enter Aden only four months later, on 14 June, after his acquiescence with the Hudaida offensive.
Griffiths has travelled to Sana'a twice in the past two months – between16 and 20 Juneand from 2 to 4 Julyin an unsuccessful attempt to secure a ceasefire. His proposal to broker a solution, including the handover of Hudaida to a third party, was accepted by the Houthi in June, even though they publicly rejected it. Although the group’s support is largely intact, its lacks the military hardware, especially airpower, to contain Emirati- and Saudi-backed forces, allowing them to rapidly capture Hudaida’s airport. Houthi fighters are attempting to stall the offensive through guerrilla tactics. Their leaders realise the asymmetry of forces, and will likely accept a solution which allows them a stake in governance and allows them to keep their weapons. They unsuccessfully proposed a second ceasefire offerfollowing Griffiths’s June visit, offering to surrender the whole of Hudaida to the UN in return for Houthi fighters being allowed to remain. This was rejected by Hadi. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are unwilling to accept any solution that will allow the Houthi to maintain their arms. Further, they have demanded that Hudaida be transferred to Hadi, rather than accepting third party control. The ‘pause’ in operations during Griffith’s recent visit was thus an attempt by the Saudi-UAE coalition to allow him the space to convince the Houthi to capitulate, and has little to do with the flow of aid. Significantly, it was the UAE, not Hadi, that announcedthe ‘pause’, clearly indicating its oversized influence in the conflict.
The Houthi still control most of northern Yemen, including the capital Sana'a, where the majority of the country’s population resides. Moreover, the group’s ability to use guerrilla tactics will ensure that recapturing territory will be a protracted process for the Hadi-Saudi-Emirati coalition, especially since northern Yemen is mostly mountainous. Even in Hudaida, UAE-backed forces are seeking to avert street battles, which would result in a large number of deaths. The UAE ‘pause’ is thus both tactical and strategic.
Despite global criticism of the Saudi-Emirati offensive, there have been no concrete consequences for their actions, which will likely embolden them further. Even the USA, which previously had cautioned against the offensive, now tentatively supportsit. With the capture of Mukallah and Mocha, Saudi- and UAE-backed troops no longer required equipment to detect and remove sea mines and to counter land-to-sea missiles since they are able to travel on land along the coast. Additionally, the defection of troops aligned to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh from the Houthi to the Hadi camp, opened another front against the former. Abu Dhabi also countered concerns that a siege of Hudaida will prevent aid from reaching northern Yemen by sending aid, instead, overland through the UAE. The blockade on Hudaida thus also has economic benefits for the UAE.
Griffiths’s initiative, based on a leaked draft, fails to adequately address Yemen’s complexities. His travels in the past few weeks indicate that he has been forced to adopt a piecemeal approach to find common ground. This too has largely failed owing to Saudi and UAE intransigence, which will likely intensify if Hudaida is handed to Hadi. A solution for Yemen needs to be holistic, allowing for the parties to agree on sets of measures simultaneously in an attempt to catalyse compromise.
In his 18 June report to the UNSC, Griffiths promised that a new peace plan would be presented in July. However, the new situation will render it difficult for him to formulate a solution acceptable to both the Hadi and Houthi coalitions. Further, the leaked plan does not account for the many smaller conflicts within Yemen’s larger milieu.
In addition, the Saudi-UAE rejection of the UN process illustrates how little influence Hadi has in the conflict. Indeed, while he is touted as the recognised president, he is increasingly marginalised. The UAE’s increasing support for Tariq Saleh, nephew of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, could result in Abu Dhabi having him play a role similar to that of Khalifa Haftar in Libya, to ensure that the conflict endures, especially since Saleh’s rise will further pressure the already-fragmented Hadi coalition. Southern Transitional Council (STC) officials, based in Aden, have acknowledgedthat a battle for southern independence will likely commence after the Houthi are defeated. It is probable that Abu Dhabi will continue supporting the STC to secure control of the country’s Red Sea ports, most of which are located in southern provinces.
By Zeenat Adam
The May 2017 Riyadh Summit marked the first international tour of the new US president, Donald Trump. Three meetings in Riyadh – a bilateral with Saudi Arabia (KSA), a USA-Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) meeting and the US-Arab-Islamic Summit – collectively supposedly focussed on unity in the fight against terrorism. The Summit culminated in a declaration – crafted unilaterally by KSA – that proposed, among others, the establishment of an ‘Arab Alliance’ and an ‘Islamic Military Coalition’ to combat terrorism; the establishment of a counter-terrorism centre based in KSA; and a condemnation of Iran as a regional destabiliser. Contrary to the show of unity, Qatar’s emir, Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, expressed reservations about signing a declaration that had not been discussed, in clear defiance of his hosts. It is unclear whether he ultimately did sign the document.
A day later, statements attributed to Tamim – supposedly uttered at a military graduation ceremony – appeared on the website of Qatar News Agency. He was quoted praising Iran and the Lebanese resistance organisation Hizbullah, mentioning Qatar’s close ties with Israel and the USA, and proclaiming his country’s unwavering support for the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas. Additionally, tweets posted in the name of Qatar’s foreign minister declared that Qatar would withdraw its ambassadors from Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, KSA and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) because of a ‘plot’ against Qatar. The Qatari government vehemently rejected these statements, claiming the news agency website had hacked. By this time, however, the reaction from KSA, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt was becoming frenzied. Within an hour of the hacking, Saudi, Emirati and Egyptian media began a media campaign to discredit and demonise Qatar. The seemingly-orchestrated onslaught maligning Qatar as a cancer in the GCC persisted despite Kuwaiti attempts to intervene and restore calm. Tamim’s visit to Kuwait to quell the tensions was in vain, as KSA and the UAE refused to entertain any explanations, leading to a shock announcement on 5 June 2017 that both states had severed ties with Qatar. They were followed by Egypt, Bahrain and, later, other Arab states or non-state actors aligned to KSA or the UAE, in what became one of the greatest spats in the GCC’s history.
A series of leaked emails revealing the extent of the lobbying by the UAE ambassador to Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba, added to suspicions that the GCC fallout was not as sudden and reactive as the Saudis and Emiratis portrayed it. The emails uncover the key contentious issues according to Qatar’s neighbours: the presence of US CENTCOM in Qatar, the Al Jazeera network, and support for Hamas. Otaiba’s courting of Washington neo-conservatives adds to the suspicion that the Saudis and Emiratis seek to seize the opportunity of Trump’s presidency to reconfigure the US agenda in the Middle East. The carefully orchestrated plan to isolate Qatar appears to be aimed at reinforcing Saudi hegemony in the region and cultivating a new power dynamic with the Trump administration. The renewed courtship with America is led on the Saudi side by the deputy crown prince and defence minister, Mohammed bin Salman, who has been at the forefront of decision-making since his aged father, King Salman ascended the throne in January 2015. His ambitious vision for Saudi Arabia and his aggressive, impulsive resort to military action against perceived rivals is setting the scene for regional upheaval. The Emiratis have also been flexing their petrodollar muscles to exert influence in the region, led primarily by Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Muhammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan who has been aggressively building up an arsenal of weaponry to support his interventionist motives.
As tensions between Qatar and its neighbours heighten, more questions arise as to the future of the GCC and the expected result of the dramatic siege of the tiny peninsula state. Without providing evidence, the anti-Qatar alliance led by KSA and UAE accuses Qatar of supporting terror organisations. The list of individuals on their ‘terror list’ appears to be a regurgitated post-9/11 CIA list that was laid to rest over a decade ago, and which has been dug out of some dusty archive for lack of any other credible evidence against Qatar. Organisations on the list appear to mainly be humanitarian and charity groups that have been active in war-torn regions. Qatar, KSA and UAE have all been deeply involved in Middle East conflicts, with proxy wars playing out in Syria, Libya and Yemen in particular. None of the three have been neutral in supporting factions that may have committed war crimes and atrocities and / or have been accused of being terror organisations. Thus, the KSA-UAE accusation against Qatar is a case of ‘the camel never seeing its own hump, but only those of others’. The allegations of Qatari terror funding and destabilisation of the region through its policy of engagement with Iran, support for Al Jazeera, and support for the Muslim Brotherhood are bones of contention but it is unclear how much the anti-Qatar alliance expects Doha to concede on these issues, especially since it would encroach on its sovereignty and independence.
Perhaps the alliance, and KSA in particular, cares little about sovereign rights of states like Qatar, which it has long treated as an extension of its eastern province. It has even been suggested that the anti-Qatar alliance is plotting for regime change in Qatar; unsubstantiated rumours surfaced in Egyptian and Emirati media weeks before the Riyadh Summit that the Tamim’s father was planning to support one of his other sons, the current deputy emir and Tamim’s half-brother, Abdullah bin Hamad Al Thani in a coup against his brother. These rumours are likely unfounded and generated outside Qatar among those who believe the real power in Qatar is with Tamim’s mother, Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser Al Misned, a prominent figure who has been repeatedly disparaged by Qatar’s patriarchal neighbours. She has been at the forefront of social and educational transformation in Qatar, and served as a UNESCO Special Envoy for basic education. Her children were groomed for leadership and she has stood as a model for women’s empowerment in the Gulf.
Further whisperings of regime change, also emanating from Egypt, attempted to open old wounds in Qatar’s history by goading Tamim’s distant cousin, Saud bin Nasser Al Thani, into making a claim for the position of emir. These attempts fail to consider that Qatar is a constitutional monarchy, and Qataris talk of a ruling family as opposed to a royal family. Its historical succession has not traditionally been one of primogeniture, but of regency and consensus within the ruling family. Furthermore, the split between the two wings of the ruling family dates to a 1940s succession debate when then-emir, Abdullah, intended for his son Hamad to succeed him. Unfortunately, Hamad died prematurely, but an agreement was reached within the ruling family that Abdullah’s other son, Ali, would assume the helm until Hamad’s son Khalifa would be able to rule. Ali, however, handed over the affairs of state to his son Ahmad in 1960, contrary to the agreement, and in opposition to the Hamad faction of the Al Thani family. In 1972 Khalifa, the rightful heir, deposed Ahmad. Any claim by Ahmad’s heirs would be contrary to the historical agreement, and would require consensus from the entire Al Thani clan, numbering more than 20 000 in Qatar alone. In addition, Tamim’s father, the former emir, Hamad, focussed, during his rule, on bringing the Ahmad faction back to Qatar from self-imposed exile and reunifying the factions, though there may still be some within the clan who feel disgruntled and entitled to power. To ensure that the matter would be laid to rest, the constitution stipulated that the succession of the rule of state would be hereditary in the male lineage of Hamad bin Khalifa bin Hamad bin Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani.
There is no inclination to effect regime change by installing a ruler from outside the Al Thani clan, but any such attempt would fail, first of the constitution, and second because the Al Thani family has led the Qatari tribes with little opposition since the British Empire entered the territory in the 1800s.
Most analysts trace the current tensions between Qatar and its neighbours to the Middle East and North Africa uprisings, when Qatar positioned itself apart from the rest of the GCC in supporting the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, events unfolded sporadically and the momentum was organic. In both countries, parties linked to the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power through the popular vote, to the dismay of other Arab dictators. Qatar’s role was minimal but for extensive coverage on Al Jazeera, which became the people’s channel – broadcasting their revolution live from Tahrir Square to the world. Once the governments in these two countries were democratically elected, Qatar provided keen support – financially and politically. The uprisings also presented Qatar with an opportunity to exert influence and affect the outcomes in other areas where similar uprisings were simmering, but where the leadership was militarily more equipped to suppress the people. In Libya, Qatar was instrumental in lobbying for international intervention, which subsequently set the country on a debilitating course of war. Similarly, in Syria, Qatar was one of the first countries to openly support the Free Syrian Army and is also alleged to have supported al-Qa'ida-linked Nusra Front. Qatar’s stance in Bahrain, however, was far more ambiguous as it joined the GCC coalition in support of the Bahraini monarchy; but coverage by Al Jazeera left its Gulf neighbours wondering if its allegiance to the coalition was genuine. Similarly, in Yemen, whilst Qatar contributed troops to the Saudi coalition forces, it strongly expressed the view that the Houthi should be engaged as a legitimate party; Saudi Arabia considers the Houthi terrorists.
KSA and Qatar now find themselves at opposites, though not for the first time. The polarisation during the MENA uprisings boiled down to the views of each country on the Muslim Brotherhood. In the late 1950s the Gulf states served as a haven for Brotherhood activists escaping persecution from Egypt and Syria. During the 1970s a Saudi society (Al-Sahwa al-Islamiya – the Islamic Awakening) was formed, inspired by the Brotherhood. KSA rendered support to the Brotherhood until the 1991 Gulf War when Al-Sahwa opposed the kingdom’s position of inviting US intervention in Iraq, and began to mobilise for democratic and political reform. Similarly, in the UAE, an organisation with roots in the Brotherhood, Al-Islah wa al-Tojihi al-Ijtima (The Reform and Social Guidance Association) was established in Dubai in the early 1980s. During the MENA uprisings, Al-Islah began to call for democratic reforms, and was subsequently banned as a terror organisation, along with the Brotherhood. With its prominence in uprisings, the Brotherhood suddenly became an existential threat to the monarchies. Qatar provided a haven to Brotherhood clerics and Al Jazeera stood as the driving force of popular revolution. This prompted GCC members in 2013 to secure themselves against one of their own by ensuring that Qatar committed to ‘principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other GCC countries and not support anyone who threatens the security and stability of other GCC countries, including organisations…and not supporting the antagonistic media’. However, a few months later three countries recalled their ambassadors from Qatar citing non-compliance with the pact. Qatar was forced to make some concessions eight months later, ahead of the next GCC summit, including the closure of the live Al Jazeera channel, Al Mubasher Misr in Egypt and requesting some members of the Muslim Brotherhood to leave Qatar. Exiled members sought refuge in Istanbul.
Historically, Saudi Arabia has viewed the tiny territory of Qatar as an irritant that should be dispensable due to its diminutive size, but which always tried to play in the big leagues. Until the early 1990s, KSA dominated the GCC, which had been established in response to the security concerns from the 1980s Iran-Iraq war. As a miniscule state, Qatar had always relied on alliances with mightier external actors to ensure its security, notably the Ottomans, British Empire, and the Saudis. The 1995 coup by Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani against his father Khalifa, a staunch Saudi ally, irked the Saudis who supported the former emir in a failed counter-coup attempt in 1996. Most of Qatar’s nuanced policies were developed during Hamad’s reign from 1995 until his abdication to Tamim in 2013. Credit is also due to the then foreign minister and later prime minister, Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabr Al Thani, as the architect of Qatar’s enigmatic foreign policy. By the end of the first Gulf War in 1991, whilst Hamad bin Khalifa was heir Apparent, Qatar began to woo the Americans, who soon established US CENTCOM (Central Command) at Qatar’s Al Udeid military base. Having the military might of the world’s superpower just a few dunes away from the regional big brother emboldened Qatar to embark on its ambitious plans for development. The second major development was the founding of the Al Jazeera News Network, and the third was its embarking on economic investments through its sovereign wealth fund aimed at diversifying its gas-based economy. This allowed Qatar to position itself at the centre of numerous international political dialogues, as it did not shy away from criticising the US interventions in the Middle East, whilst concurrently expressing a willingness to engage adversaries and position itself as a peace broker. No doubt Qatar’s financial clout greatly contributed to its political ambitions; often leaving its neighbours feeling slighted by its brazen actions. Often, Qatar would be reminded of Saudi’s seniority, particularly when it tried to influence the outcomes of GCC and Arab League summits. This would frequently occur when Qatar tried to present a conciliatory tone in discussions regarding Iran – a sensitive matter for the region and a view which KSA is not tolerant of. Qatar has maintained cordial, yet cautious, relations with Iran due to the proximity of the two countries and the fact that they share the North Dome / South Pars gas field. The wars in Yemen and Syria found Qatar and Iran on opposing sides, but Qatar has consistently held that diplomatic engagement would be more beneficial than hostility and military aggression, a position its GCC partners do not agree with. Iran has exploited the rising tensions between Qatar and its neighbours by extending a hand to Qatar; Doha has, however, been cautious not to be over-eager to befriend Iran in this sensitive time.
The smear campaign against Qatar has isolated geographically and politically. The economic impact of the siege will likely be severe, considering that air traffic has been affected, impacting on the successful Qatar Airways, and hindering importation. Ground transport across the border with KSA has been completely shut off. Sea ports are limited, and access to the UAE port of Jebel Ali has been restricted, making the movement of aluminium and LNG challenging. Qatar has begun using Omani ports, and has been offered the use of three Iranian ports. Food imports have been seriously affected, but Iran and Turkey have become new sources of fresh produce, and a ‘buy local’ campaign has been launched, enhancing growth in the local market. Moody’s had downgraded Qatar’s status prior to the siege, and other ratings’ agencies did so since. Fitch dropped Qatar’s credit rating from AA to negative, noting that a prolonged siege may affect its credit outlook. The stock market has been significantly affected, but indications are that Qatar has sufficient investments abroad to ensure its survival should further economic sanctions be applied. Stress on gas production has been evident with the shutdown of two helium production plants, impacting on 32% of the global market. This is an early warning of what could potentially happen should the blockade affect Qatar’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) and gas-to-liquids (GTL) plants. World powers would be wary of allowing the anti-Qatar alliance to push Doha to the extent that it begins to flex its energy producing muscles and threatens a world energy crisis. Gas production is not governed by OPEC, and therefore Qatar is not regulated in its production or price settings. It would have the potential to cripple Asian giants like Japan and South Korea but the real question is whether it would consider retaliation against the UAE by cutting off the Dolphin Energy gas pipeline to the Emirates. Thus far, Qatar seems to have adopted measured responses, and emphasised the need to enter into dialogue to resolve differences, but the anti-Qatar alliance appears determined to force its way irrespective of the consequences.
The push for US sanctions on Qatar through the Congressional Bill HR 2712 (Palestinian International Terrorism Support Prevention Act of 2017) bolsters the suspicion that the action against Qatar was not sudden, but was part of a broader plan for reconfiguring the Middle East. The bi-partisan sponsored bill already appears to be gaining momentum in Washington DC, and clearly targets Qatar (and Iran), without specifically mentioning its name, by its allusion to the sponsors of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It proposes economic and military sanctions against individuals, entities, organisations and organs of state. The banking sector is specifically mentioned. Were this bill to pass, it will have far-reaching consequences in the further isolation of Qatar, and in the ability of Qatar to do business with the rest of the world. The bill and the actions against Qatar are likely to have devastating effects on Hamas, possibly constraining the capacity of the movement to continue to resist Israeli occupation, or forcing it to make unimaginable compromises that could be devastating for the Palestinian cause.
There are strong indications that Israel- and KSA-funded lobbyists had pushed for the bill to be tabled, and it is no mere coincidence that its timing corresponds with the siege on Qatar. Israel expressed strong support of the anti-Qatar alliance, with Israel’s Deputy Minister for Diplomacy tweeting: ‘No longer Israel against Arabs but Israel and Arabs against Qatar-financed terror’. The Saudi and UAE insistence for Qatar to break links with Hamas, and their promoting the notion that Qatar undermines Palestinian-Israeli peace beg the question whether their new-found friendship with Israel and the relationship with Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi have any bearing on these demands. There are strong indications that Israel has been cooperating covertly for some time with both KSA and UAE. In recent years the GCC had been increasingly muted in addressing the flagrant disregard of international resolutions by Israel. Qatar expressed extreme frustration with the GCC in 2008 when the GCC refused to hold an emergency session on the margins of its Summit in Kuwait to condemn the Israeli onslaught on Gaza. Qatar has financially supported Gaza with humanitarian and reconstruction aid after both the 2008 and 2014 Israeli attacks. It has been instrumental in mediating between the Palestinian factions to bring about unity, and supported the Saudi-led Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, proposing a normalisation of relations with Israel, which the Saudis tried to reignite earlier this year, against the backdrop of their own warming relations with Tel Aviv.
It remains unclear what tangible outcome the anti-Qatar alliance seeks to achieve from the current escalation other than battering what they see as a delinquent into submission. Any suggestions of regime change will not be welcomed by Qataris who hugely support Tamim, and have a strong sense of national pride. The siege has sent Qatar’s patriotism to an all-time high, even amongst non-Qatari residents. An expression of allegiance to Tamim by the Bani Hajer and Al Murrah tribes, which span the Arabian Peninsula, has caused concern in Saudi Arabia, which fears other tribes, including the Bani Tamim, whom the Al Thani family derives its lineage from, will follow suit. The siege has already had a negative impact on the lives of Gulf nationals who are married across state lines or whose families and tribes were divided by national borders, but who, until two weeks ago, had ease of movement between Gulf states. Any coup or transfer of power will not significantly alter Qatar’s policies, and will, instead, leave the country more vulnerable to internal strife, as it would be seen to lack integrity, pride and independence. Qatar is unlikely to accede to the shutting down of Al Jazeera, a demand (sometimes threatening) of several Arab states over the years that it has withstood.
Kuwait’s attempts to negotiate a de-escalation may yet succeed, but an escalation, including the option of military intervention (though minimal at this stage) cannot be completely ruled out. Any such move would be catastrophic for the region, polarising the Muslim and Arab world and drawing other regional powers into the conflict. KSA is clearly lobbying other countries to join its alliance against Qatar, with a growing number of countries seemingly willing to do so. Saudi Arabia appears to be courting several African states for support with either offers of millions of investment dollars or threats of divestment. Pledges of support by these client states is indicative not only of the immediate isolation of Qatar, which has massive huge investments in Africa and membership of La Francophonie, but possibly of a potential plan to table motions against Qatar at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Arab League, and perhaps even the United Nations.
Qatar would not be able to withstand a military incursion without outside support, even though it has pulled back its troops from Yemen and the border region between Djibouti and Eritrea. Turkey has strongly supported Qatar and has begun to fast-track the deployment of about 3 000 troops to Qatar based on a pre-existing military cooperation agreement. Iran is keen to align with Qatar, as demonstrated by its immediate deployment of foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to Ankara on 7 June to engage his Turkish counterpart on collaborative means to support Doha. It is, however, unlikely that Qatar will choose to align itself too closely with the GCC’s antagonist while facing the prospect of sanctions or expulsion from the council. Qatar’s options may appear limited but the anti-Qatar alliance has drawn itself into a quagmire that would be difficult to withdraw from. Other world leaders have been weighing in on the crisis. US President Donald Trump initially expressed glee at the siege, taking credit for the notion. Washington has sent conflicting signals to Qatar since the blockade, as the White House has aligned itself with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in accusing Qatar of support for and funding of terrorists, whilst the Pentagon continues to engage Qatar more constructively, including through a new arms sale and joint military and naval exercises. French President Emmanuel Macron has urged dialogue, whilst Russian President Vladimir Putin joined Erdogan in calling on all parties to ‘develop compromise solutions in the interest of preserving peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region’.
The siege will undoubtedly have far-reaching ramifications for GCC. The values upon which the GCC was formed may still be important for its member states, but culture, language and familial ties cannot be the sole basis for unity when political ideology and military ambitions undermine the prospects of shared values. Unification of the states and integration will not be possible in a climate of mistrust. Threats to regional security in the form of wars in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria require a unified vision that will not be possible if GCC members have different views on the root causes of these conflicts, and view each other as enemies. The absence of trust between member states, together with the lack of transparency, accountability and an archaic notion that the public must remain submissive to a ruling elite, does not augur well for the GCC’s future, and may even lead to renewed popular mobilisation for democratic change in the Gulf. This is already indicated by a petition by GCC nationals calling for citizen participation in political decision-making, noting that ‘arbitrary and extreme actions’ such as the blockade would not have happened in a democratic environment. With Qatar not willing to concede, and the anti-Qatar alliance not backing down, the dissolution of the GCC in its current form is likely.
* Zeenat Adam served as South Africa’s deputy ambassador to Qatar between 2005 and 2009, and is currently an independent international relations strategist
The 5 June decision by Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and their allies and proxies – Egypt, Bahrain, the Maldives, Mauritania and rival governments in Libya and Yemen – to sever diplomatic and other links with Qatar is payback for Qatar’s support of the wave of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2010-2011. It represents, for KSA and UAE, another phase in their process since 2011 to reverse the changes brought about by the uprisings.
The sanctions on Qatar aim to force the government of Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani to alter its foreign policy – particularly regarding its warming relations with Iran, and to end its financial and political support for Islamist dissidents in the region such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
The Saudi-led move followed and was encouraged by US President Donald Trump’s visit to KSA in May, and his 21 May speech in Riyadh where he supported stronger action against Iran, and spoke out against terrorism – including Hamas in his list of terrorist groups.
Saudi and Emirati claims
The main reason advanced by KSA and UAE for harsh measures such as the land-sea-air embargo and travel prohibition for citizens of these countries, was a statement attributed to Al Thani, in which he allegedly praised Iran’s regional role and criticised states seeking to declare the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) a terrorist organisation. The 23 May statement, published on the website of the state-owned Qatari News Agency, is likely a hack, as the Qatari foreign ministry has claimed. No audio or video footage exists of the emir’s speech, purportedly presented at a graduation ceremony for National Guard officers at the Al Udeid base. Although the alleged statement may reflect the broad trajectory of Qatari foreign policy, Al Thani is unlikely to have expressed such sentiments publicly. Moreover, statements praising Hizbullah and criticising the US are at odds with Qatar’s policy and national interest, especially considering that Qatar supports forces opposing Hizbullah in Syria, while the US troops stationed at Al Udeid are critical to Qatar’s security.
Nevertheless, there are indications of a warming of relations between Qatar and Iran, as evidenced by Al Thani’s 27 May congratulatory phone call to Iran’s re-elected president, Hassan Rouhani, during which he proposed enhancing Qatari-Iranian ties. Further, reports that Qatar paid a $1 billion ransom for Qatari royals kidnapped in Iraq, and that about $700 million ended up with Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, also enraged the KSA and UAE. KSA viewed these moves as compromising its battle with Iran for regional hegemony. For the Saudis, this is the main reason for its action against Qatar.
The UAE, on the other hand, used the KSA action to pursue its agenda of trying to force Qatar to cease support for the MB and other such groups. Since 2011, it has worked strenuously to undermine and destroy the MB-aligned organisations throughout the region through attempting to finance parties such as Nidaa Tounes in Tunisia (against the Islamist Ennahda), by militarily supporting the campaigns of Khalifa Haftar in Libya, and by supporting the 2013 coup in Egypt which overthrew the MB’s Mohammed Morsi.
Both KSA and UAE regarded Qatar’s support for civil society action during the 2011 uprisings as incompatible with their regional aims, upsetting the regional balance, and potentially ultimately threatening their own monarchies.
The sanctions, however, did not happen entirely suddenly and without careful consideration. In 2014, the KSA and UAE, together with Bahrain, recalled their ambassadors from Doha in a successful attempt to weaken Qatari ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. The current sanctions follow a campaign by, mainly, the UAE to demonise Qatar, particularly in the USA where, in the run-up to the breaking of ties, fourteen op-eds in US media attacked Qatar and called for the USA to downgrade relations with that country. And, at the end of May, Saudi media alleged Qatar’s foreign minister, Mohammad bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, secretly met with Qasim Sulaimani and discussed enhanced intelligence cooperation between the two countries.The cutting of ties by Egypt, Yemen, the Maldives, Mauritania, the House of Representatives in eastern Libya, and the Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi government in Yemen was primarily in support of the Saudi and Emirati benefactors of these actors. There has been some suspicion in the region that KSA and UAE would act against Qatar, but the suddenness (and severity) took everyone by surprise. It is possible that the suddenness is related to recently leaked email correspondence of UAE ambassador to Washington, Yousef al-Otaiba, which reveal his country’s disdain for US-Qatari relations, anger at the US military base in Qatar, and envy about Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The emails hint at Otaiba’s role in the anti-Qatar campaign in Washington over the past few weeks.
To justify the action, the two countries have accused Doha of threatening the region’s stability, ‘adopting’ terrorist organisations – including the Islamic State group, and supporting opposition Shi'a groups in Bahrain and eastern Saudi Arabia. Much of this is untrue. What is true, however, is that the UAE-KSA and Qatar also support different (even opposing) sides in Egypt, Libya and Syria, and both countries regard Qatar as an obstacle to their agenda for the region.
Saudi and Emirati objectives
Following the conclusion of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Saudi Arabia has attempted to contain Iran’s growing influence in the region. The kingdom has sought to enhance this containment strategy by advocating unity among ‘Sunni’ states, and by tolerating (and even sponsoring) Islamists linked to the MB, such as Yemen’s Islah movement. Trump’s singling out Iran as the greatest regional threat emboldened KSA, and especially its inexperienced deputy crown prince Mohammad bin Salman. The Riyadh declaration, which KSA issued after Trump’s visit, vociferously admonished Iran’s regional role and advocated a coordinated containment strategy. However, Qatar was regarded as not being entirely compliant with KSA’s wish to isolate Iran.
The UAE focused mainly on Qatari support for Islamists such as Hamas and the MB, which the Emiratis believes pose a greater threat to them than Iran. This conformed to Cairo’s position on the MB, and Egypt thus fell in line with the UAE, already a major financial backer of the Egyptian state under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Abu Dhabi also used the situation to reduce tension between forces it supports in Yemen and those supported by KSA. Pressure had been building since June 2016, when the UAE redeployed its frontline forces to southern Yemen, to consolidate the gains of the secessionist Southern Movement (Al-Hirak), in opposition to Saudi interests. Worsening the situation, in February 2017, forces loyal to the UAE prevented Hadi, heavily supported by KSA, from landing at Aden’s airport, forcing Riyadh to mediate in an attempt to enforce Hadi’s ‘prerogative’. There was likelihood of even further deterioration when the UAE-supported forces routed those of Hadi, and consolidated control over the Aden airport. At the heart of these differences is UAE opposition to Saudi support for Yemen’s MB-aligned Islah movement.
The UAE thus expertly exploited the inexperience of Saudi Arabia’s thirty-one-year-old deputy crown prince to create a false consensus around Qatar. Significantly, the suspension of Qatari troops from Yemen as part of KSA-UAE sanctions will empower UAE-supported groups, at the expense of Saudi-supported Hadi. Although Qatar’s troop contingent was small, Doha and Riyadh have comparable interests in Yemen – which are not the same as the UAE’s.
In what is definitely a major diplomatic crisis for the Gulf, other countries are also becoming engaged. Apart from KSA and UAE allies that also cut ties with Qatar, Jordan has downgraded its links. On the other hand, Iran offered to export food to Qatar from Iranian ports – which are around 200 nautical miles from Doha, and Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erodgan, defended Qatar, opposing the sanctions. Furthermore, on Monday, less than a day after the sanctions were implemented, Turkey exported planeloads of food to Doha to replace food that had previously been imported from KSA. The USA, which has its largest Middle East military base, and 11 000 troops, in Qatar, has issued contradictory messages. While Trump tweeted support for the sanctions, claiming responsibility for its success, the Pentagon praised Doha for hosting US troops and for its ‘enduring commitment to regional security’, and US secretary of state Rex Tillerson offered to mediate. The USA will likely attempt to ensure the smooth continuation of relations with both Doha and Riyadh, and will seek to maintain the unity of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
As in 2014, Kuwait and Oman will attempt to mediate a resolution to the crisis. Neither has severed ties with Qatar, and Kuwait’s emir has been shuttling around the Gulf to seekagreement on a mediation process. Both states maintain good ties with Iran, and Oman was involved in preliminary negotiations for the nuclear dealin March 2013, helping to ensure face-to-face talks between Iranian and American officials prior to the commencement of public negotiations. However, resolving the dispute this time will be more challenging, especially since the demands on Qatar are multifaceted, and because the measures instituted are more wide-ranging than in 2014.
Qatar faces three possible options. First is the unlikely possibility of it aligning with Iran. Second, it could buckle under the pressure and give in to KSA-UAE demands, especially since it depends on Gulf transit routes for its food security, and because of its strong economic links with Saudi Arabia. Such a capitulation could mean that members of Hamas and the MB residing in Doha will be expelled (possibly to Turkey and Lebanon). Further, Qatari media activities will be severely curtailed, and the AlJazeera network, in particular, will have its wings clipped and will begin resembling other Gulf media outlets, in addition to the likely shutting down of Britain-based Al-Arabi al-Jadid as well as other websites financed by Qatar. Palestinian exile and intellectual Azmi Bishara will likely be expelled as per the demand of the KSA-UAE alliance. Qatar’s links with Iran will also have to be firmly cut. The third option is that Qatar remains defiant, and joins with Turkey to informally form a third axis – which could include Oman and Kuwait, and could see some involvement of Iran. With countries such as Turkey and Pakistan seeking to balance relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, albeit unconvincingly at times, this third axis is already slowly emerging. Heavy-handed measures such as the current siege on Qatar are increasingly forcing smaller states to unhappily choose sides, accelerating the development of a third path, even if informally. The possibility of the emergence of such a third axis (and the possibility of Qatar refusing to give in) increased dramatically Wednesday night when the Turkish parliament passed legislation to facilitate the posting of as many as 3 000 troops in the Turkish military base in Qatar. Qatar might have momentarily been on the ropes, but its allies (and hopeful allies, such as Iran) have come out swinging. David Hearst argues that, in fact, the action against Qatar is doomed to fail, and Doha's two Gulf antagonists had bitten off more than they can chew.
The increasing tension also indicates a weakening of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was established in 1981 to ensure unity and coordination among Gulf countries, as a response to the 1979 Iranian revolution. Although GCC countries have been coordinating on regional policing, established the Peninsula Shield Force military arm, and signed agreements on economic and taxation matters, the organisation has been increasingly fragmented by different stances of individual states. In 2013, for example, Oman was widely criticised for hosting secret negotiations between Iran and the USA, prior to the nuclear deal; in 2014, Oman and Kuwait refused to recall their ambassadors from Qatar; and in 2016, when KSA severed ties with Iran, Bahrain was the only GCC member to follow suit. No matter how the current crisis ends, the GCC will emerge weaker. If Qatar refuses to capitulate, that could spell the beginning of the end of the council.
By Kenneth Katzman
Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have been loyal and crucial allies of US policy in the Gulf region for over three decades. Some Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, have been pillars of US Gulf policy since the end of World War II. Furthermore, the Gulf states have fully supported all US interventions in the region in which their interests matched those of the United States. The 1991 Persian Gulf War against Saddam Hussein is one such example.
Perhaps more significant is that the Gulf states have even supported the United States in cases where the outcome of US intervention might threaten GCC interests. They supported Operation Iraqi Freedom (in March 2003) which aimed to remove Saddam Hussein from power, making bases and facilities available but not supplying any actual forces. The GCC states provided this logistical and material support (although publicly opposing the action as an unjustified war on an Arab state) even though they knew that ousting Saddam would inevitably lead to an Iraq dominated by the majority Shiite Arab Muslims.