By Rafiq Habib
The 3 July military coup in Egypt had a number of key objectives. By it, the military attempted to entrench its position in the state, regardless of who holds power. It further sought to restore the networks of the previous regime to the political scene. By becoming a key governance partner with the elected power, the military seeks to place the deep state under central command and to ensure a centralisation of the intelligence services. The goal was to establish a secular alliance that was loyal to the former regime. This would enable the networks of the former regime to mobilise under a political veneer provided by secular forces. In order to achieve some of these objectives, the armed forces worked together with friendly western countries, especially the USA.
By Afro-Middle East Centre
It is now widely acknowledged that the 3 July ouster of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Mursi, constituted a military coup. Events following the coup have sought to reset Egypt’s policies back to what they were during the Mubarak era, underscoring the suggestion that a counter revolution was successfully instituted. The Egyptian constitution was suspended, the Shura Council – the upper house of parliament –was disbanded, and various Islamist leaders – from the Muslim Brotherhood and other parties – were arrested. Moreover, media deemed to be sympathetic to Mursi were shut down, and the decades-long state of emergency was reinstituted. Further, the army selected a judge previously appointed to the constitutional court by Mubarak, Adli Mansour, as interim president, and an interim cabinet dominated by Mubarak-era holdovers. The aftermath of the coup also saw a shift in foreign policy: a more belligerent attitude towards the USA, greater friendliness with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, and a hardline attitude towards Palestinians – with the Rafah border being almost permanently shut, and ninety per cent of the Egypt to Gaza tunnels being destroyed. In short, the coup has had and is set to have significant domestic, regional and global consequences.
By AlJazeera Center for Studies
On Wednesday evening, 3 July, after the expiry of the deadline for the forty-eight hour ultimatum given to Egyptian president, Mohamed Mursi, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the minister of defence, announced Mursi’s overthrow. Sisi carefully ensured that, when he made the announcement, he was surrounded by the sheikh of al-Azhar, Coptic Pope, a representatives of the National Salvation Front (NSF) – including Mohamed Elbaradei, two representatives of the Tamarod movement, and the president of the Nour Salafi party, to give the impression that the announcement of the overthrow of the president and the annulment of the constitution did not represent a coup, but was merely an expression of the national will, and a response to the demands of protesters against the president. But the well-planned scene did not succeed in obscuring the fact that Sisi’s announcement lacked any legal or constitutional basis.
By AlJazeera Centre for Studies
At the end of August 2012, Egypt's first civilian and first post-revolution president, Muhammad Mursi, completed his second month in office. The president, whose assumption of power sparked waves of doubt and ridicule, seems to have settled into his new job quite well after a tough run-off and a narrow electoral victory. In doing so, he has refuted all expectations of his quick fall and has reflected rare political statesmanship and great courage in decision-making. After his four brief trips outside the country, Mursi seems determined to revive Egyptian foreign policy.
By Afro-Middle East Centre
The past few weeks have witnessed a convergence of several important issues facing post-uprising Egypt: new Egyptian president Muhammad Mursi’s opportunism in his attempt to reform the judiciary (as he was able to do with the military), the lack of accountability of those responsible for human rights abuses, post-conflict justice and the outstanding new constitution. This has culminated in a battle for the independence of a judiciary that is one of the last bastions of the old regime.